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The Jeffersonian ideal of the citizen-farmer has been reduced to 
mere folklore. Although farmers undoubtedly remain engaged citizens 
and agriculture continues to be the primary economic driver in rural 
communities, the declining number of farms1 and the increasing size 
and intensity2 of remaining farming operations has transformed the 
rural landscape from the pastoral images of the American Gothic3 to 
one of industrialization portrayed in the recent documentary Food, Inc.4 
On the demand side of this agricultural supply chain, a disconnect 
emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century between the 
consumer and farmer. Populist songs such as Old McDonald’s Farm 
faded from the public consciousness. In an age of plenty, many 
consumers did not bother to think seriously about where their food 
came from, who produced it, and the environmental consequences of 
the evolving mass-production systems dotting the rural landscape. 
The 1960s and 1970s era of social engagement and “back to the land” 
movement was replaced with consumerism, the Walmart effect, and 
increasing isolation from the realities of agricultural production. The 
turn of the twenty-first century, however, witnessed a renewal of food 
awareness and accompanying consumer demand for transparency, 
along with calls for a shortening of the food supply chain to provide 
better quality products that supported the local farm economy. 
 
1 See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., STATISTICAL REPORTING SERVICE, TREND CONTINUES 
TOWARD FEWER AND LARGER FARMS (Jan. 10, 1968), available at http://usda.mannlib 
.cornell.edu/usda/nass/NumbFarmLa//1960s/1968/NumbFarmLa-01-10-1968.pdf (discussing 
decrease in number of farms from 1959 through 1968); CAROLINE S. GLEATON & CARL G. 
ANDERSON, FACTS ABOUT TEXAS AND U.S. AGRICULTURE, 86–90 (May 10, 2010), 
available at http://agecoext.tamu.edu/fileadmin/user_upload/Documents/Resources 
/Publications/Facts/2010/AgFacts.pdf (discussing decrease in number of farms from 1964 
through 2009). 
2 One example is in the dairy industry, where the number of dairy farms has decreased 
by thirty-eight percent between 2000 and 2009, while milk production has increased 
thirteen percent over the same time frame. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Milk Cows: Number 
of Operations by Year, US, NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., 
http://www.nass.usda.gov/Charts_and_Maps/Milk_Production_and_Milk_Cows/cowoper.
asp (last visited Apr. 21, 2011); U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Milk: Production by Year, U.S., 
NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., http://www.nass.usda.gov/Charts_and_Maps 
/Milk_Production_and_Milk_Cows/milkprod.asp (last visited Apr. 21, 2011). 
3 Grant Wood’s American Gothic epitomizes the rural work ethic of Midwestern 
farmers. See The Art Institute of Chicago, About This Artwork, ARTIC.EDU, http://www 
.artic.edu/aic/collections/artwork/6565 (last visited Apr. 21, 2011). 
4 FOOD, INC. (Robert Kenner & Eric Schlosser 2009). 
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Although garnering considerable media attention,5 the revival of food 
movements has for the most part remained confined to a relatively 
small segment of the American market. Sales of organic food—one 
measure of consumers’ food consciousness—have grown 
tremendously,6 but still comprise a small percentage of total food 
sales.7 The number of farmers’ markets has more than doubled in this 
decade,8 but is insignificant when compared to traditional grocery 
stores.9 The United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) 
“Know Your Farmer, Know Your Food” program has sought to 
bridge this gap and elevate the status of the farmer, but even this 
program raised the ire of some farming groups, who claim that USDA 
was unfairly denigrating large-scale commodity agriculture 
production by highlighting the achievements of localized specialty 
crop farmers selling fruits and vegetables.10 In sum, a growing 
number of consumers are now more aware of food production issues, 
but the overall percentage with in-depth understanding remains small. 
The disconnect between farmer and consumer is not solely a rural-
urban divide. The Environmental Working Group’s annual 
publication of government subsidy payments received by farmers has 
engendered significant discord in rural communities. Townfolk 
struggling to keep local stores open look with disgust—or perhaps 
 
5 For example, a Westlaw database search of The New York Times from 2008–2010 
resulted in 314 hits for the phrase “local food” and 229 hits for “organic food.” 
6 U.S. sales of organic products have increased from $1 billion in 1990 to $24.8 billion 
in 2009. Organic Trade Ass’n, Industry Statistics and Projected Growth, OTA.COM, 
http://www.ota.com/organic/mt/business.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2011). 
7 The Food Marketing Institute, the trade group for the grocery wholesale and retail 
industry, reported total supermarket sales in 2009 of $556.973 billion. FMI, Supermarket 
Facts, FMI.ORG, http://fmi.org/facts_figs/?fuseaction=superfact (last visited Apr. 21, 
2011). 
8 Agric. Marketing Serv., USDA Announces that National Farmers Market Directory 
Totals 6,132 Farmers Markets, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.ams 
.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ams.printData.do?template=printPage&navID=&page=printPage 
&dDocId=STELPRDC5085966&dID=136193&wf=false&docTitle=USDA+Announces 
+that+National+Farmers+Market+Directory+Totals+6%2C132++Farmers+Markets 
(noting a sixteen percent growth in farmers markets from 2009 to 2010); U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., Number of Operating Farmers Markets, USDA.GOV, http://www.usda.gov 
/img/content/Numbers_of_Farmers_Markets_1994-2010.jpg (last visited Apr. 21, 2011) 
(indicating an increase from 2863 markets in 2000 to 6132 in 2010). 
9 The Food Marketing Institute reported more than 35,000 supermarkets with annual 
sales above $2 million. Food Mktg. Inst., Supermarket Facts, FMI.ORG (2009), 
http://fmi.org/facts_figs/?fuseaction=superfact. 
10 Letter to The Honorable Tom Vilsack, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., from Senators 
John McCain, Saxby Chambliss, and Pat Roberts (April 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.agri-pulse.com/uploaded/KnowYourFarmers.pdf. 
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envy—at the farmer cashing a six-figure subsidy check and driving a 
new pickup to shop at the regional Walmart supercenter. Although 
rural communities certainly understand the connection between 
farming and food, the postmodern scale of commodity grain farming 
and animal confinement facilities has begun to unravel the previously 
robust fabric of rural communities.11 
The broader public’s general apathy with regard to food 
production, however, rests upon shaky ground. Over the past decade a 
series of major food safety incidents has captured the public’s 
attention—at least for a few days, until the collective attention returns 
to the latest development on the Jersey Shore or other reality TV 
fixation. For example, in 2010 ninety-four people in sixteen states fell 
ill from Salmonella l4,[5],12:i:- in alfalfa sprouts,12 almost 2000 
suffered from Salmonella enteritidis in eggs,13 and 272 individuals in 
forty-four states contracted Salmonella montevideo from spices used 
in Italian-style deli meats.14 In 2009, two individuals were sickened 
by Escherichia coli O157:H7 in raw cookie dough,15 another 235 
consumers were struck by Salmonella saintpaul from alfalfa sprouts,16 
and more than 700 individuals were sickened by Salmonella 
typhimurium in peanut butter, with nine deaths attributed to the 
 
11 See Caroline Tauxe, Family Cohesion vs. Capitalist Hegemony: Cultural 
Accommodation on the North Dakota Farm, 17 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 291, 291 
(1992) (discussing role of large agribusiness on changing social fabric). 
12 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Investigations of a Multistate Outbreak 
of Human Salmonella I 4,[5],12:i:- Infections Linked to Alfalfa Sprouts, DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. (Dec. 28, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/i4512i              
-/122810/. 
13 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Investigation Update: Multistate Outbreak of 
Human Salmonella Enteritidis Infections Associated with Shell Eggs, DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERV. (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/enteritidis/#investigation; 
see Food & Drug Admin., Frequently Asked Questions and Answers: FDA’s Investigations 
into the Salmonella Enteritidis Outbreak Involving the Recall of Shell Eggs, DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/Food 
/NewsEvents/WhatsNewinFood/ucm223723.htm. 
14 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Investigation Update: Multistate Outbreak of 
Human Salmonella Montevideo Infections, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. (May 4, 
2010), http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/montevideo/. 
15 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Mulitstate Outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 
Infections Linked to Eating Raw Refrigerated, Prepackaged Cookie Dough, DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. (Jun. 30, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/ecoli/2009/0630.html. 
16 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Investigation of an Outbreak of Salmonella 
Saintpaul Infections Linked to Raw Alfalfa Sprouts, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. 
(May 8, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/saintpaul/alfalfa/. 
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strain.17 In comparison, 2008 was relatively mild with only 1442 
cases of Salmonella saintpaul occurring across forty-three states; the 
strain was attributed to hot peppers and possibly tomatoes from farms 
around Tamaulipas, Mexico.18 Health officials linked 272 illnesses to 
Salmonella l4,[5],12:i:- in frozen pot pies in 2007.19 That same year, 
officials linked 425 illnesses to Salmonella tennessee in peanut 
butter20 and thirty-two illnesses to ground beef with E. coli O157:H7, 
prompting the second largest meat recall in U.S. history and forcing 
Topps Ground Beef into bankruptcy.21 In 2006 E. coli O157:H7 in 
shredded iceberg lettuce caused seventy-one illnesses,22 and in bagged 
spinach caused over 200 illnesses and three deaths.23 Other significant 
instances of foodborne illness included prepackaged lettuce in 2005,24 
raw almonds25 and presliced Roma tomatoes26 in 2004, green onions 
 
17 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Investigation Update: Outbreak of 
Salmonella Typhimurium Infections, 2008-2009, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. 
(Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/typhimurium/update.html (may have 
caused nine deaths). 
18 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Investigation of Outbreak of Infections 
Caused by Salmonella Saintpaul, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. (Aug. 28, 2008), 
http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/saintpaul/jalapeno/. 
19 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Investigation of Outbreak of Human 
Infections Caused by SALMONELLA 4,[5],12:i:-, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. 
(Oct. 29, 2007), http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/4512eyeminus.html. 
20 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Salmonellosis—Outbreak Investigation, 
February 2007, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. (Mar. 7, 2007), http://www.cdc.gov 
/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/salmonellosis_2007/030707_outbreak_notice.htm. 
21 Recall Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food Safety & Inspection Serv., Updated: New 
Jersey Firm Expands Recall of Ground Beef Products Due to Possible E. Coli O157:H7 
Contamination, FSIS-RC-040-2007 (Oct. 6, 2007), available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov 
/PDF/Recall_040_2007_Exp_Update.pdf; Associated Press, Topps Meat to Close Down 
After Meat Recall, MSNBC.COM (Oct. 5, 2007), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id 
/21149977/ns /business-us_business. 
22 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Multistate Outbreak of E. coli O157 
Infections, November–December 2006, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. (Dec. 14, 
2006), http://www.cdc.gov/ecoli/2006/december/121406.htm. 
23 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Update on Multi-state Outbreak of E. coli 
O157:H7 Infections From Fresh Spinach, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. (Oct. 6, 
2006), http://www.cdc.gov/foodborne/ecolispinach/100606.htm. 
24 Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Issues Nationwide Health Alert on 
Dole Pre-Packaged Salads (Oct. 2, 2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents 
/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2005/ucm108495.htm. 
25 Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Paramount Farms Expands Recall of Raw 
Almonds (May 22, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/ArchiveRecalls 
/2004/ucm111607.htm. 
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in 2003,27 ground beef28 and poultry products29 in 2002, and assorted 
beef products in 2000.30 A 2011 report from the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) estimated that each year there are 38.4 
million episodes of foodborne illness in the United States, resulting in 
71,878 hospitalizations and, tragically, 1686 deaths.31 
Is industry to blame for these deaths? If so, why hasn’t the tort 
system corrected this externality?32 Is it that consumers engage in 
unsafe food handling practices to cause these injuries? Or are the 
deaths a regulatory problem? As the Supreme Court noted in United 
States v. Dotterweich, food safety affects “the lives and health of 
 
26 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, FDA Investigates Certain ROMA Tomatoes 
as Source of Foodborne Illness Outbreaks in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Mid-Atlantic States, 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. (July 23, 2004), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents 
/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2004/ucm108332.htm. 
27 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Vol. 52, No. 47, HEPATITIS A 
OUTBREAK ASSOCIATED WITH GREEN ONIONS AT A RESTAURANT—MONACA, 
PENNSYLVANIA, 2003, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1155–57 (Nov. 28, 
2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5247a5.htm. 
28 See Elizabeth Becker, 19 Million Pounds of Meat Recalled After 19 Fall Ill, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 20, 2002, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?sec=health&res 
=9B01E2D91F39F933A15754C0A9649C8B63&pagewanted=1. 
29 Marian Burros, Eating Well; Listeria Thrives in Political Hotbed, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 
30, 2002, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?sec=health&res=9A02E3DF 
123FF933A05753C1A9649C8B63. 
30 Paola Farer, Colorado Plant Linked to E. coli Outbreak Story, MARLER CLARK (Aug. 
25, 2000), http://www.about-ecoli.com/ecoli_outbreaks/news/colorado-plant-linked-to-e-
coli-outbreak-story. 
31 Elaine Scallan et al., Foodborne Illness Acquired in the United States—Unspecified 
Agents, 17 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 16, 16 (2011). At first glance, one might 
conclude that the 71,878 hospitalizations and 1686 deaths per year from foodborne illness, 
id., is an improvement from the numbers in the CDC’s previous (1999) report of 325,000 
hospitalizations and 5000 deaths, Paul S. Mead, et al., Food-related Illness and Death in 
the United States, 5 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 605, 607 (1999), but the authors of 
the 2010 report noted that different data and methodologies used in the 2010 report 
prevent any comparison with the 1999 report. Scallan et. al., supra at 19–21 (discussing 
differences in methodology from the CDC’s 1999 report). Scallan et. al., Foodborne 
Illness Acquired in the United States—Major Pathogens, 17 EMERGING INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 7, 7 (2011). 
32 For an insightful discussion of why the food industry has not embraced certain food 
safety practices despite the possibility of tort liability, see generally Neal D. Fortin, The 
Hang-Up with HACCP: The Resistance to Translating Science into Food Safety Law, 58 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 565 (discussing the difficulty of tracing back responsibility for 
foodborne illness and the reluctance of the food industry to embrace the HACCP food 
safety procedures that would reduce foodborne illness). See also Jean C. Buzby & Paul D. 
Frenzen, Food Safety and Product Liability, 24 FOOD POL’Y 637 (1999) (discussing 
weaknesses in product’s liability system for foodborne illness). 
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people which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are 
largely beyond self-protection” and thus in need of government 
regulation.33 Justice Jackson, in his dissent in Dalehite v. United 
States, further explained this justification for government intervention 
based on the changing nature of modern-day consumption: 
This is a day of synthetic living . . . [when] our population is 
dependent upon mass producers for its food and drink . . . [that are 
no longer] natural or simple products but complex ones whose 
composition and qualities are often secret. Such a dependent society 
must exact greater care than in more simple days and must require 
from manufacturers or producers increased integrity and caution as 
the only protection of its safety and well-being. . . . Where 
experiment or research is necessary to determine the presence or the 
degree of danger, the product must not be tried out on the public, 
nor must the public be expected to possess the facilities or the 
technical knowledge to learn for itself of inherent but latent 
dangers. The claim that a hazard was not foreseen is not available to 
one who did not use foresight appropriate to his enterprise.34 
What can the government do to further prevent foodborne illness 
and promote food safety? Unfortunately, regulating the food system is 
not the same as regulating the mechanical safety of an automobile. 
Relatively straightforward command-and-control regulatory programs 
with which the government has a track record of success35 do not fit 
squarely with the diffuse nature of food production and distribution. 
Nor can the externality of foodborne illness be controlled in the same 
manner as pollution from the smoke stack of a chemical factory. The 
regulatory paradigm facing government food safety reformers 
involves an agricultural industry that (1) remains the primary driver of 
economics, politics, and social engagement in rural society; (2) is of 
increasing scale and intensity; and (3) provides essential sustenance to 
 
33 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943). Until the mid-nineteenth century, most food regulation 
occurred at the local level, reflecting the scope of commerce at the time. As commerce 
expanded into regional and national food networks, states exercised jurisdiction over food 
regulation, with most states having some form of food regulation in place by 1900. Paul 
Hyman, U.S. Food and Drug Law and FDA—A Historical Background, in A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE TO FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION 15 (2d ed. 2002). After the 
introduction of more than 100 food and drug bills in Congress between 1880 and 1906, 
Congress finally passed the 1906 Food and Drug Act and the 1906 Meat Inspection Act. 
Id. at 17–18. 
34 346 U.S. 15, 51–52 (1953). 
35 See, e.g., William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today—Has the Clean Water Act Been 
a Success?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 542 (2004) (discussing the remarkable success of the 
EPA and Clean Water Act in controlling point sources of pollution and slowing the loss of 
wetlands). 
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our nation and nations abroad. These factors do not preclude 
improvements in food safety, but do complicate the process of 
mustering the political will for necessary reform. 
Evaluating prospects for reform require an understanding of the 
current system and its constituents—especially the agencies subject to 
change. Accordingly, Part I provides a brief overview of the historical 
development of the food safety system in the United States and an 
exploration of the split in regulatory authority between the two 
primary food safety agencies—the USDA and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). This division of responsibility among 
government agencies adds to the difficulty of regulating the diverse 
food supply chain—an issue analyzed in Part I in greater detail and 
throughout this Article. 
Part II explores the first of this Article’s two discussions of recent 
examples of food safety failures within this multiagency jurisdictional 
environment—fresh-cut leafy greens contamination. In 2006, several 
hundred people fell ill after consuming bagged spinach contaminated 
with E. coli O157:H7. In the prior ten years, there were twelve 
documented outbreaks of E. coli in leafy greens.36 But rather than 
addressing the structural issues leading to the food safety lapse, the 
FDA issued draft guidelines.37 Meanwhile, the processing industry 
organized a voluntary marketing agreement to safeguard against 
future outbreaks while retailers incorporated private “super-metrics” 
standards into their supply contracts. At the federal level, a group of 
large processors proposed the creation of a national marketing 
agreement, which would incorporate some disease-prevention 
measures. Although the USDA has not finalized the proposed 
marketing agreement, some aspects of the Food Safety Modernization 
Act may address safety issues in leafy green production and 
processing.38 
 
36 Daniel Cohen, The History, Politics & Perils of the Current Food Safety 
Controversy: CAFF Guide to Proposed Food Safety Regulations, COMMUNITY ALLIANCE 
WITH FAMILY FARMERS, Jan. 2008, at 21, available at http://www.caff.org/CAFF 
.Policy.Guide.l.pdf. 
37 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY: GUIDE TO MINIMIZE MICROBIAL FOOD SAFETY HAZARDS OF LEAFY 
GREENS; DRAFT GUIDANCE (July 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/Guidance 
ComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/ProduceandPlanProducts/ucm1742
00.htm. For further discussion of FDA’s role in fresh-cut produce safety, see Part III.D, infra. 
38 See H.R. 2751, 111th Cong. §§ 103, 105 (2011) (Specifically, Section 418 requires 
implementation of hazard analysis and risk-based preventive controls (i.e., HACCP or  
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In 2010, more than 1900 people were struck with Salmonella from 
shell eggs, prompting the largest egg recall in history.39 
Unfortunately, this was not a new food safety issue, but one the 
government had grappled with for more than two decades without 
success.40 The lack of progress in addressing the issue stemmed from 
the failure of multiple government agencies—the Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Agricultural Marketing Service 
(AMS), and the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) in the 
USDA, and the FDA in the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS)—to coordinate responsibilities to ensure the safety 
and quality of eggs and egg products.41 Accordingly, Part III analyzes 
the shell egg regulatory regime in light of the most recent food safety 
failure. 
This Article concludes with a comparative analysis of the 
government and private industry responses to the repeated instances 
of foodborne illness in fresh-cut greens and shell eggs. These 
stakeholder reactions expose several governance concerns—
particularly issues of voice, accountability, and fairness—that both 
industry and government should consider in the wake of declining 
public confidence in the nation’s food safety system. Finally, the 
authors explore how passage of the FDA Food Safety Modernization 
Act may moderate some of the critical governance issues in the leafy 
greens context and impact future development of private “super-
metrics” and industry-led marketing agreements. 
 
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point methodology) in all food processing facilities and 
Section 419 requires the FDA, in cooperation with USDA and other agencies, to issue 
production and harvesting standards for fruits and vegetables). “HACCP is a management 
system in which food safety is addressed through the analysis and control of biological, 
chemical, and physical hazards from raw material production, procurement and handling, 
to manufacturing, distribution and consumption of the finished product.” Food & Drug 
Admin., Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP), U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERV., http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/HazardAnalysisCriticalControl 
PointsHACCP/default.htm (last updated July 20, 2009). 
39 See Food & Drug Admin. Salmonella Enteritidis Outbreak in Shell Eggs, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/food/newsevents 
/whatsnewinfood/ucm222684.htm. 
40 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-99-184, FOOD SAFETY: U.S. LACKS A 
CONSISTENT FARM-TO-TABLE APPROACH TO EGG SAFETY 2 (July 1, 1999) [hereinafter 
GAO EGG SAFETY], available at http://archive.gao.gov/f0902b/162324.pdf. 
41 Id. See also Lyndsey Layton, Unsafe Eggs Linked to U.S. Failure to Act, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 11, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content 
/article/2010/12/10/AR2010121007485.html (noting that “Balkanization was a key factor 
in the government’s failure to regulate eggs over the past two decades”). 
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I 
DEVELOPING A SAFE FOOD PRODUCTION SYSTEM: 
A PATCHWORK QUILT 
The history of the food safety system in the United States has been 
the subject of extensive scholarship over the years.42 Although 
comprehensive in its treatment of the agencies’ regulatory authority, 
little attention has focused on the overall role of the agricultural 
production system and the development of the agencies’ holistic role 
in promoting safety within the broader food supply chain. As 
described in more detail below, the regulatory system for the 
production of safe food is the product of ad hoc decision making 
arising from legislation designed to address the crisis du jour while 
appeasing an organized and active commodity production system 
rather than the development of a comprehensive, systematic program 
designed around the production of safe, nutritious food. 
Tracing back to the earliest government engagement in food 
production, consumer safety has taken a back seat.43 In 1820, the 
House of Representatives formed the House Committee on 
Agriculture,44 followed by the Senate Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry five years later.45 Interestingly, none of the 
twenty jurisdictional areas committed to the House Committee 
mention food safety.46 The same is true of the jurisdiction for the five 
 
42 See Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and 
Materials, 1–22 (2d ed. 1991); Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing 
Federal Food Safety Regulation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 61 (2000); Peter Barton Hutt, 
Food Law & Policy: An Essay, 1 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 1 (2005); Peter Barton Hutt, 
Symposium on the History of Fifty Years of Food Regulation Under the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act: A Historical Introduction, 45 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 17 (1990); 
Peter Barton Hutt & Peter Barton Hutt II, A History of Government Regulation of 
Adulteration and Misbranding of Food, 39 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 2 (1984); Jesse D. 
Lyon, Coordinated Food Systems and Accountability Mechanisms for Food Safety: A Law 
and Economics Approach, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 729 (1998). 
43 See generally Emily J. Shaffer, Is the Fox Guarding the Hen House? Who Makes the 
Rules in American Nutrition Policy, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 371 (2002) (discussing the 
government’s failed attempts to balance support for food production with nutrition goals). 
44 See H. Comm. Agric., Committee History, HOUSE.GOV http://agriculture.house.gov 
/singlepages.aspx?NewsID=25&LSBID=23 (last visited Apr. 24, 2011). 
45 See S. Comm. Agric., Nutrition & Forestry, Committee History, SENATE.GOV, 
http://agriculture.senate.gov/site/cmtehistory.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2011). 
46 See H. Comm. Agric., supra note 44. 
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Senate subcommittees.47 And yet agriculture is the starting point for 
the nation’s safe food supply. 
In 1862, Congress established the USDA48 and the land-grant 
university system.49 The 1887 Hatch Act created experiment stations 
affiliated with each state’s land-grant university to facilitate 
agricultural research.50 Not surprisingly, in light of the jurisdiction of 
the congressional committees and the relatively localized nature of 
food production and consumption, these institutions focused on 
facilitating a system of agricultural production to feed the country’s 
westward expansion and growing population, not the safety of the 
food supply chain. This singular focus, however, remained steadfast 
despite the lengthening of the food supply system from local to 
international and the potential for widespread food contamination due 
to consolidation of processing and distribution in the supply chain. 
With the support of the USDA and the land-grant system, the post-
war period through the 1970s witnessed a period of agricultural 
intensification using postwar technologies and capital investment 
focusing on increased per-acre yields for commodities under the 
USDA mantra of “get big or get out.”51 
Another famous USDA phrase from this era was to plant “fence 
row to fence row,” thereby eliminating many of the buffer strips and 
natural habitat surrounding a farmer’s fields.52 The resulting 
conversion of these areas to full-time crop production had a serious 
detrimental effect on environmental values such as water quality and 
 
47 See S. Comm. Agric., Nutrition & Forestry, supra note 45. 
48 Department of Agriculture Organic Act, ch. 72, 12 Stat. 387 (1862) (current version 
at 7 U.S.C. § 2201 (2010)). 
49 First Morrill Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat 503 (1862) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 301–
308 (2010)). 
50 HATCH Act, ch. 314, 24 Stat. 440 (1887) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 361a–361i 
(2010)). 
51 Although often attributed to USDA Secretary Earl Butz in the 1970s, the policy of 
“get big or get out” originated in the Eisenhower administration and USDA Secretary Ezra 
Taft Benson. See Pete Daniel, Not Predestination: The Rural South and Twentieth-Century 
Transformation, in THE AMERICAN SOUTH IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, 91, 97 (Craig S. 
Pascoe et al. eds., 2005). Secretary Butz added further encouragement for the 
consolidation and industrialization of agricultural production with his slogan of “adapt or 
die.” See Jim Chen, Get Green or Get Out: Decoupling Environmental from Economic 
Objectives in Agricultural Regulation, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 333, 335 (1995). 
52 James M. Jeffords, Soil Conservation Policy for the Future, 37 J. OF SOIL & WATER 
CONSERVATION 10 (1982). As discussed below, many of the private industry safety 
standards for leafy greens require “sterile” fields, including the elimination of all 
vegetation. See infra note 178 and accompanying text. 
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soil erosion, not to mention habitat loss. This seemed inapposite to the 
agency’s mission of fostering agricultural productivity as well as the 
USDA’s lessons allegedly learned from the mistaken public policies 
responsible for creating the Dust Bowl.53 But the potential risks 
embedded in technological solutions to industrial-scale externalities 
seemed of little consequence. 
Despite the USDA’s long-standing primary objective of 
maximizing agricultural production, the agency retained a major role 
in ensuring the safety of the food supply even after the 1940 transfer 
of the FDA from the USDA to the Federal Security Agency, 
reorganized as the Department of Health and Human Services.54 This 
has, at times, placed the agency in a difficult position when food 
safety proposals conflict with agricultural productivity, such as yield-
per-acre or animal slaughtering requirements. 
Primary enforcement of the nation’s first food safety statute—the 
Pure Food Act of 190655—resided with the USDA’s Bureau of 
Chemistry,56 which was later reorganized as the FDA.57 The 1906 
Meat Inspection Act similarly provided the USDA’s Bureau of 
Animal Industry jurisdiction over meat safety.58 Specifically, the Act 
required inspection of livestock before slaughter and sanitary 
standards of slaughterhouses and processing plants.59 The 1940 
transfer of the FDA to the Federal Security Agency included a 
transfer of enforcement powers over the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, 
 
53 See TIMOTHY EGAN, THE WORST HARD TIME 267 (2006) (discussing the mistaken 
production policies of the USDA in bringing about the Dust Bowl); citing REP. OF GREAT 
PLAINS DROUGHT AREA COMM. (Aug. 27, 1936), available at http://newdeal.feri.org 
/hopkins/hop27.htm. 
54 See Reorganization Plan No. IV of 1940, 54 Stat. 1237, § 12 (1940); see also Richard 
A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing Federal Food Safety Regulation, 31 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 61, 84 n.131 (2000) (describing the rationale for President Roosevelt’s 
transfer of FDA from USDA). 
55 Pure Food & Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (June 30, 1906) (repealed 
1938). 
56 Id. §§ 4, 5 (providing authority to USDA’s Bureau of Chemistry). 
57 In 1930 the name of the Bureau of Chemistry changed to the Food and Drug 
Administration. See Michelle Meadows, A Century of Ensuring Safe Foods and 
Cosmetics, FDA CONSUMER MAG., Jan.–Feb. 2006, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA 
/WhatWeDo/History/FOrgsHistory/CFSAN/ucm083863.htm. 
58 Pub. L. No. 59-382, 34 Stat. 674 (June 30, 1906) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 
601). 
59 Id. 
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and Cosmetic Act,60 the successor to the Pure Food Act. However, 
jurisdiction over meat products remained with the USDA, 
establishing a historical split in regulatory authority that remains 
today. 
Subsequent food safety legislation concerning animals, such as the 
1957 Poultry Products Inspection Act61 and the 1970 Egg Products 
Inspection Act,62 vested jurisdiction in the USDA, rather than under 
the FDA’s general purview for food safety via the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act. The result is a confused regulatory system in which 
different agencies exercise jurisdiction over a product depending upon 
the stage in production and the relative meat or poultry content in the 
end product. 
Pizza is an infamous example of this byzantine system of 
multiagency oversight. At the farm input stage of the supply chain, 
the USDA has jurisdiction over plant seeds, the FDA oversees the 
safety of animal feed, and the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) regulates chemical inputs. On the farm, all three agencies have 
an oversight role in the production of wheat for the crust and tomatoes 
for the sauce, and the USDA and the FDA share jurisdiction over the 
animals. At the first level of processing, the FDA has jurisdiction over 
the milling of wheat into flour, the USDA and the FDA regulate 
tomato sauce processing and cheese production from the dairy cow, 
and the USDA has sole jurisdiction over the slaughter of the pigs and 
manufacturing of pepperoni. At the second stage of processing, the 
assembly of the ingredients into pizza, the FDA has sole jurisdiction 
over the manufacturing of a cheese pizza, while the USDA has sole 
authority over a meat pizza by virtue of the meat content.63 
The government’s egg safety program presents a similar regulatory 
two-step between the USDA and the FDA, depending on whether the 
issue is egg safety or quality and whether the egg is in the shell—
considered a “shell egg”—or broken to create an “egg product.”64 In 
 
60 52 Stat. 1040 (June 23, 1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.). 
61 71 Stat. 441 (1957) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 451 et seq.). 
62 84 Stat. 1620 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 1031 et seq.). 
63 U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-RCED-99-256, U.S. NEEDS A SINGLE 
AGENCY TO ADMINISTER A UNIFIED, RISK-BASED INSPECTION SYSTEM 6 (Aug. 4, 1999) 
(statement of Lawrence J. Dyckman), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999 
/rc99256t.pdf. 
64 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 40, at 4. The USDA’s Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) also administers a program to control Salmonella 
Enteritidis in breeding flocks that supply hens to laying flocks. See USDA, National 
Animal Health Surveillance System, National Poultry Improvement Plan—Salmonella  
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general, the FDA has the responsibility for the safety of shell eggs 
throughout the supply chain. This responsibility included, in late 
2009, implementation of a long-awaited Salmonella enteritidis 
eradication program.65 Moreover, the 1991 amendments to the Egg 
Products Inspection Act provided FDA authority for shell egg safety 
at the retail level, including at groceries, restaurants, and 
institutions.66 USDA’s Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) 
assumes jurisdiction when shell eggs are directed to a processing 
plant for breaking to make egg products.67 Once these egg products 
leave the factory and enter commerce, however, the regulatory 
responsibility shifts back to the FDA.68 Another USDA agency, the 
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), regulates shell egg quality 
under both the voluntary egg grading program and the mandatory 
Shell Egg Surveillance Program.69 Shell egg packers participating in 
fee-based grading program may affix the official USDA grade shield 
to products meeting USDA quality standards. The mandatory 
surveillance program seeks to ensure that shell eggs are wholesome, 
unadulterated, and properly labeled.70 As part of the compulsory 
surveillance program, USDA inspectors visit each packing plant at 
least four times per year. In contrast, FDA inspectors rarely visit shell 
 
Enteritidis, NSU.APHIS.USDA.GOV, http://nsu.aphis.usda.gov/inventory/activity.faces 
?INVENTORY_NUMBER=30 (last visited Apr. 24, 2011) (describing the agency’s 
Salmonella enteritidis surveillance program). 
65 On July 9, 2009 the FDA issued a final rule, with a compliance date of July 9, 2010, 
requiring “shell egg producers to implement measures to prevent Salmonella Enteritidis 
(SE) from contaminating eggs on the farm and from further growth during storage and 
transportation.” Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production, 
Storage, and Transportation, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,030, (July 9, 2009) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 
118) [hereinafter FDA SE Final Rule]. The legal authority for this program rests in both 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 342(a)(4), 371(a) (2010) and the 
Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 243, 264, 271 (2010). For further analysis of the 
FDA program, see A. Bryan Endres & Michaela N. Tarr, United States Food Law Update: 
Initial Food Safety Restructuring Efforts, Poultry Production Contract Reforms and 
Genetically Engineered Rice Litigation, 6 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 103, 119–123 (2010). 
66 See 21 U.S.C. § 1034(e)(3) (2010). 
67 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 40, at 33. An egg product is “any dried, 
frozen, or liquid eggs, with or without added ingredients, excepting products which 
contain eggs only in a relatively small proportion or historically have not been, in the 
judgment of the Secretary, considered by consumers as products of the egg food industry.” 
21 U.S.C. § 1033(f). 
68 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 40, at 33. 
69 Id. at 34. 
70 Id. at 35. 
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egg facilities.71 AMS also has developed a voluntary Plant Sanitation 
and Good Manufacturing Practices Program for shell egg processors 
and a fee-based service to conduct third-party monitoring for an 
industry-developed safety program.72 To help sort out their respective 
responsibilities between shell eggs and egg products to prevent 
overlaps and regulatory gaps, the USDA and the FDA have entered 
into a series of memorandums of understanding.73 
As described above, the USDA has a significant statutory role in 
ensuring a safe food supply. And yet the predominant view by many in 
the agency remains that production is the agency’s primary, and 
perhaps sole, mission. For example, the stated mission of AMS is “to 
facilitate the competitive and efficient marketing of agricultural 
products,”74 despite its responsibility for grading and labeling eggs, 
quarterly plant inspections, developing sanitation and good 
manufacturing practices, and implementing industry-developed safety 
programs—clear examples of food safety responsibilities. The 
Administrator of AMS explicitly rejected the agency’s food safety 
mission, testifying bluntly to Congress that “AMS is not a food safety 
agency.”75 
In stark contrast, the FDA has embraced its consumer protection 
role,76 to the extent Congress has provided sufficient financial 
 
71 Id. at 3. 
72 Id. at 35–36. 
73 See Consumer and Marketing Service, Egg Products Inspection Act, Cooperative 
Agreement with Food and Drug Administration for Administration and Enforcement, 37 
Fed. Reg. 2686-04 (Feb. 4, 1972); Regulatory Activities Concerning Residues of Drugs, 
Pesticides, and Environmental Contaminants in Foods, 50 Fed. Reg. 2,304-01 (Jan. 16, 
1985); Refrigeration and Labeling Requirements for Shell Eggs, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,569, 
48,572 (Oct. 27, 1992) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 56, 59) (discussing memorandum of 
understanding executed between FDA and AMS on May 19, 1992; Memorandum of 
Understanding Between the Food and Drug Administration and the Agricultural Marketing 
Service, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 61 Fed. Reg. 55,646 (Oct. 28, 1996). 
74 Agric. Mktg. Serv., AMS Mission, Vision and Values, AMS.USDA.GOV, http://www 
.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateN&navID=AMS
MissionStatement&rightNav1=AMSMissionStatement&topNav=AboutAMS&leftNav 
=&page=AboutAMSMissionStatement&resultType=&acct=AMSPW (last visited Apr. 24, 
2011). 
75 Ready to Eat or Not? Examining the Impact of Leafy Green Marketing Agreements: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. of Oversight and 
Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 2 (July 2009) (statement of Rayne Pegg, Administrator, Agric. 
Marketing Serv., USDA) [hereinafter Pegg Testimony], available at http://oversight.house 
.gov/images/stories/Hearings/pdfs/20090729Pegg.pdf. 
76 Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 101, 104 (1995). 
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support.77 But existing statutes limit its jurisdiction and the agency 
must coordinate and cooperate with the USDA and other agencies 
such as Homeland Security. Although the 2010 FDA Food Safety 
Modernization Act (FSMA)78 significantly advanced the FDA’s 
oversight authority, meat,79 poultry, and some eggs remain beyond the 
FDA’s jurisdiction. And the calls for the establishment of a single 
agency to administer food safety will continue.80 
Despite AMS’s declaration that its focus is on product quality and 
does not have a food safety mission, the agency is considering a 
proposal to regulate safety directly through the conduit of quality 
through the proposed National Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement.81 
This is a rather rare approach within the context of food regulation. 
The primary food safety statute—the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act—considers quality aspects within the adulteration rubric only in 
 
77 See, e.g., Bryan Walsh, The Food Safety Bill Finally Passes, But It’s Just the First 
Step, TIME, Dec. 22, 2010, http://healthland.time.com/2010/12/22/the-food-safety-bill       
-finally-passes-but-its-just-the-first-step/print/. See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-08-1047, FOOD SAFETY: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FDA OVERSIGHT OF 
FRESH PRODUCE 18–21 (Sept. 2008) [hereinafter GAO FRESH PRODUCE REPORT], 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081047.pdf. 
78 FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011). 
79 The FDA, however, does have limited jurisdiction over live animals intended for 
food. See United States v. Tuente Livestock, 888 F. Supp. 1416, 1424 (S.D. Ohio 1995) 
(“Accordingly, the Court concludes that, in light of the structure of the FDCA and the 
legislative history of the Act, it is permissible for the FDA to interpret the term ‘food,’ as 
used in 21 U.S.C. § 331(a), to include live animals raised for food and intended to be 
offered for slaughter.”). 
80 See, e.g., Single Food Safety Agency Act of 2010, H.R. 6552, 111th Cong. (2010) 
(calling for creation of a single agency to coordinate food safety in the United States); U.S. 
GOV’T. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 63 at 9 (“Creating a single agency to administer 
food safety activities that are uniform and risk-based is the most effective way for the 
federal government to resolve long-standing problems . . . .”); see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, GAO-04-588T, FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY AND SECURITY SYSTEM: FUNDAMENTAL 
RESTRUCTURING IS NEEDED TO ADDRESS FRAGMENTATION AND OVERLAP (Mar. 30, 
2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04588t.pdf; Michael R. Taylor, Lead 
or React? A Game Plan for Modernizing the Food Safety System in the United States, 59 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 399, 401–02 (2004) (“[T]he current organizational fragmentation of 
the system . . . divides food safety leadership and defeats accountability for the system’s 
successes and failures.”); Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing Federal 
Food Safety Regulation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 61, 115–136 (2000) (arguing for 
consolidation of food safety responsibilities); Sandra B. Eskin, Putting All Your Eggs in 
One Basket: Egg Safety and the Case for a Single Food-Safety Agency, 59 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 441 (2004). 
81 See discussion infra notes 183–192 and accompanying text. 
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the rarely used “otherwise unfit for food” classification.82 In other 
words, the FDA will consider a product adulterated only if the quality 
is so bad that it is unfit for human consumption.83 As discussed in the 
following sections, the leafy greens industry—perhaps in an effort to 
stave off more intrusive federal regulation—has proposed an industry-
designed and USDA-sanctioned marketing agreement to impose 
disease prevention measures through its quality control and orderly 
marketing process jurisdiction. 
II 
LEAFY GREENS: NUTRIENT-DENSE FOODS 
WITH POTENTIALLY DEADLY CONSEQUENCES 
A.  Leafy Greens—A Blossoming Market 
It is difficult to pinpoint the precise historical origins of leafy 
greens as a food staple, though leafy greens have been around at least 
since Shakespeare’s “salad days.”84 However, only in the last twenty 
years has the humble salad—long thought to be the food equivalent of 
a movie preview—come into its own as a major food industry. It is 
true that more people are eating more fruits and vegetables in 
general85—no doubt a result of a fresh and healthy foods movement 
that has exalted organics and excoriated McDonald’s. Convenience 
has played a role in increased consumption as well: pre-bagged greens 
and pre-cut fruits save the time and hassle of slicing and dicing and 
drop easily into on-the-go brown bags and lunchboxes. The food 
service industry—including fast food restaurants, educational 
institutions, hospitals, and the military—benefits from the product 
uniformity, the lower sanitation costs, and the decreased preparation 
time that fresh-cut produce provides.86 And “significant increases in 
imported produce have made a greater variety and volume of fresh 
produce available year round.”87 
 
82 21 U.S.C. § 402(a)(3) (2010). 
83 See United States v. 298 Cases, 88 F.Supp. 450, 451 (D. Or. 1949) (finding some of 
the asparagus at issue tough and woody, but not unfit for consumption). 
84 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA, act 1, sc. 5 (“My salad days, 
when I was green in judgment: cold in blood. . .”). 
85 See GAO FRESH PRODUCE REPORT, supra note 77, at 1 (“According to the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), the average American annually consumed 13 pounds 
more fresh fruit and 50 pounds more fresh vegetables from 2003 through 2005 than from 
1983 through 1985, an increase of about 14 percent and 41 percent, respectively.”). 
86 Cohen, supra note 36, at 8. 
87 GAO FRESH PRODUCE REPORT, supra note 77, at 1. 
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Even though Americans have been eating more leafy greens, the 
term itself is broad and escapes precise definition.88 In any case, the 
category of produce marketed as leafy greens includes both whole-
head or bunch greens, such as the head of lettuce found on a farm, and 
fresh-cut greens, which are cut, processed, perhaps mixed with other 
greens, and bagged as salad. This latter category—bagged salad 
mixes—has been the main driver of the leafy greens industry’s rapid 
growth in the past twenty years. The fresh-cut produce market 
rocketed from no sales in 1985 to $3.3 billion in 1994, and then to an 
astounding $15 billion in 2005.89 Packaged salads represent fifty 
percent of the fresh-cut produce market, fruits represent twenty 
percent, all other vegetables represent fifteen percent, and baby 
carrots represent the final fifteen percent.90 
Like most major food processing industries, the leafy greens 
industry is segmented and highly structured; many different industry 
groups play roles in the “farm-to-fork” process. There are three main 
roles: producers, handlers and processors, and retailers. Leafy green 
 
88 “Leafy greens” can encompass a wide variety of produce, though leafy-greens mixes 
typically include lettuce (79% of market production value), cabbage (15%), and spinach 
(7%).  Leafy Green Vegetables in the United States: Hearing on Proposed Marketing 
Agreement No. 970 Before the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 1 (Sept. 22, 2009) (testimony of Diane 
Wetherington, Executive Vice President, Intertox), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov 
/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5079701 [hereinafter Wetherington 
Testimony]. The term could also include also include radicchio, cress, arugula, chard, 
cilantro, endive, escarole, kale, and potentially even certain herbs and spices. U.S. DEP’T 
OF AGRIC., DRAFT NATIONAL AGREEMENT REGULATING LEAFY GREEN VEGETABLES: 
DEFINITIONS at § 970.13 (2009) [hereinafter DRAFT LEAFY GREENS MARKETING 
AGREEMENT DEFINITIONS], available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0 
/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5077208 (last visited Apr. 24, 2011). This wide variance 
in product has led at least one small grower of leafy greens to frame the category mainly as 
a marketing ploy: “Leafy greens’ are not a crop, not a species, not even a group of species 
in one genera. They are a marketing category defined only by the imagination of 
processors who include various products in processed salad bags or mixes . . . .” Leafy 
Green Vegetables in the United States: Hearing on Proposed Marketing Agreement No. 
970 Before the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 1244 (Sept. 24, 2009) (testimony of David Runsten, 
Director of Policy Programs, Community Alliance with Family Farmers), available at 
http://www.ams.usda.gov /AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5080508. 
89 Cohen, supra note 36, at 8. 
90 Id. at 9. One need only look at the ten-year leafy greens production trend to observe 
the shift in consumer preferences away from fresh leafy greens to processed salad mix: 
Overall consumption of leaf lettuce, romaine lettuce, and spinach nearly doubled from 
2000 to 2007, and overall production of leafy greens has risen by 25% since 1997.  
Wetherington Testimony, supra note 88, at 3.  However, per capita use of iceberg (head) 
lettuce has steadily declined since 1995, while leaf and romaine lettuce production grew at 
a rate of 144% from 1997. Id. 
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producers grow the greens and then harvest them in the fields—either 
by hand or mechanically, and either as whole plants or single leaves.91 
After harvest, the greens are shipped by truck to handlers, who 
“receive, acquire, sell, process, ship, distribute, or import leafy 
greens” in their natural form.92 Processors receive whole greens and 
then wash, dry, cut, and bag them into value-added products such as 
salads—sometimes mixing different types of greens together in the 
process.93 
The group of farmers who grow leafy greens is as broad and 
diverse as the food category itself. According to 2007 USDA data, 
there are approximately 11,500 leafy greens growers in the United 
States, though the numbers are likely incomplete due to the self-
reported nature of the data.94 Of those 11,500, approximately eighty-
nine percent, or 10,235, fall within the USDA’s definition of “small 
farm.”95 Leafy greens are grown and produced throughout the United 
States, though the market is concentrated primarily in California and 
Arizona. California produces slightly more than half, or fifty-one 
percent, of the fresh vegetables by value grown in the United States—
including eighty-two percent of head lettuce, eighty percent of 
romaine lettuce, seventy-nine percent of leaf lettuce, and seventy 
percent of spinach, according to 2008 estimates.96 Though leafy 
greens production is not confined to farms of a certain size,97 it is 
clear that large farms supply the bulk of California’s leafy greens. 
Indeed, eighty-three percent of all of California’s lettuce comes from 
just 102 California farms, and all of these farms exceed 500 
 
91 Leafy Green Vegetables in the United States: Hearing on Proposed Marketing 
Agreement No. 970 Before the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 4 (Sept. 22, 2009) (testimony of James 
Strachan, Grower’s Express), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile 
?dDocName=STELPRDC5079702 [hereinafter Strachan Testimony]. 
92 DRAFT LEAFY GREENS MARKETING AGREEMENT DEFINITIONS, supra note 88, at § 
970.10. 
93 Strachan Testimony, supra note 91, at 5. 
94 Wetherington Testimony, supra note 88, at 8. 
95 Id. 
96 Leafy Green Vegetables in the United States: Hearing on Proposed Marketing 
Agreement No. 970 Before the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 1 (Sept. 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5079851 (testimony 
of Mechel Paggi, Director, Center for Agricultural Business). 
97 See Cohen, supra note 36, at 10 (“Leafy green farming appears distributed among a 
few mega-farms with over 10,000 producing acres, a modest number of mid-sized farms    
. . . and a large number of quite small farms with a small percentage of production.”). 
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production acres.98 Therefore, despite the large number of farms 
growing leafy greens, the industry concentration of growers is high 
enough such that “large producers control enough of the supply that 
any one large producer can have a big impact on fresh leafy green 
pricing nationwide.”99 
The handling or processing segment of the leafy greens industry 
fits the same profile as the farm-production segment: broad and 
diverse, but highly concentrated in terms of market power. USDA 
survey data from 2007 show approximately 1285 handlers or 
processors in the United States.100 There are two types of handlers: 
“first handlers,” who buy from growers and deal primarily in whole 
produce, and “second handlers,” who buy from first handlers and who 
may turn whole greens into value-added products that are then sold to 
retailers such as Walmart or Publix Super Markets.101 First handlers 
range from small companies that source from only a few local organic 
growers102 to large companies that contract with multiple farmers who 
have growing fields larger than 1000 acres.103 The biggest players in 
the industry, however, are the second handlers—who have 
differentiated themselves by establishing nationally distributed leafy 
green brand names, which they supply with greens from both their 
own facilities and partnerships with leafy greens handlers that do not 
 
98 Id. at 12. And only the very largest of these large farms have the production capacity 
to meet the needs of the fresh-cut processing industry. One study estimates that only about 
100 California farms supply leafy greens processors with uncut produce—just 2.6% of all 
California vegetable growers and 0.1% of California farms overall. Id. 
99 Strachan Testimony, supra note 91, at 4. 
100 Wetherington Testimony, supra note 88, at 8. “[H]andling and processing are . . . 
spread out across the country so that leafy greens may be produced in one state, processed 
in another state, and then shipped for consumption to many states.” Id. at 9. 
101 Strachan Testimony, supra note 91, at 5. 
102 See, e.g., Leafy Green Vegetables Handled in the United States; Hearing on 
Proposed Marketing Agreement No. 970 Before the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 1 (Sept. 22, 
2009) (testimony of Dale Coke), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile 
?dDocName=STELPRDC5079734 (describing Coke Farm as a handler that represents, 
sells, and ships “approximately 50 different kinds of fruits and vegetables for about 15 
organic growers in California’s central coast region”). 
103 See, e.g., Leafy Green Vegetables Handled in the United States; Hearing on 
Proposed Marketing Agreement No. 970 Before the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 1 (Sept. 24, 
2009) (testimony of Josh Hinerfeld, CEO, Organically Grown Company), available at 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5079858 (describing 
Organically Grown Company as a handler that “[sources] produce from over 300 suppliers 
that range in size from a few acres to operators that operate in multiple states”). 
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have their own retail brands.104 These major second handlers have 
worldwide supply chains and operate in a highly concentrated market, 
with just two firms—Fresh Express and Dole—controlling seventy-
two percent of the market in 2006.105 
The takeaway point, then, is that the leafy greens industry 
represents a diverse group of players, from farmers with a single ten-
acre plot of lettuce to multibillion-dollar companies. The sometimes 
divergent interests of these industry groups will come into play in the 
discussion of the proposed National Leafy Greens Marketing 
Agreement that follows. 
B.  Food Safety in Leafy Greens Leaves Much To Be Desired 
Recently, leafy greens growers and producers have been facing a 
problem—a food that is supposed to keep consumers healthy has 
instead been making them sick. Indeed, in the last twenty years, fresh 
produce in general has increasingly been associated with bacterial 
disease outbreaks that have sickened consumers and halted production 
of some of the most popular salad-mix greens.106 
However, leafy greens—especially those processed, cut, and 
bagged for the fresh-cut industry—are a particular problem. The FDA 
has confirmed twelve distinct outbreaks of the bacterium E. coli 
 
104 For example, Ready Pac has partnered with two non-retail handlers—OBIM of Fort 
Worth, Texas, and Missa Bay of Swedesboro, New Jersey—who supply leafy greens that 
are sold under the Ready Pac brand. Ready Pac, Company Profile, READYPAC.COM, 
http://www .readypac.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2011). Not surprisingly, the rise of 
a national market for fresh produce has led to increased formality in the way leafy greens 
are purchased from growers. Historically, most produce was sold through the “spot 
market”—that is, from farmer to processor without benefit of a formal contract. 
Wetherington Testimony, supra note 88, at 9. Though some small farmers still sell “on 
spot” to farmers’ markets, CSAs, and roadside stands, today’s large leafy greens producers 
almost invariably sell to handlers or producers through seasonal, long-term contracts. Id. 
105 Cohen, supra note 36, at 9. The next two firms on the list, Ready Pac and 
Earthbound Farms (Natural Selection Foods), controlled 8% and 6% of the market, 
respectively—meaning that in 2006, four firms controlled 86% of the leafy greens market. 
Id. The rise of formal contracting for the sale of leafy greens has had an effect on the 
market price for them: “Because so much of the industry does business by contract, spot 
markets have minimal affect on pricing with shipping point prices now serving as the 
pricing floor.” Strachan Testimony, supra note 91, at 5. 
106 Unpublished FDA data show that between 1996 and 2006, there were at least 96 
bacterial outbreaks associated with the consumption of fresh produce, resulting in 14 
deaths and another 10,253 illnesses. GAO FRESH PRODUCE REPORT, supra note 77, at 10. 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) believes that these numbers are 
“greatly underestimate[d]” due to the number of people who do not seek medical treatment 
for food poisoning. Id. 
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O157:H7 in leafy greens between May 1996 and September 2005.107 
These outbreaks, which resulted in a total of 258 confirmed illnesses, 
were all traced back to leafy greens—mainly lettuce, romaine, or 
spinach—grown primarily for the fresh-cut processing industry in 
California.108 But perhaps the most-publicized incident to date—and 
the one that has spurred the loudest calls for change among food 
safety advocates—is the September 2006 outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 
traced to bagged spinach from California’s Salinas Valley. That 
outbreak, which lasted a month and eventually spread to twenty-six 
states, resulted in 3 deaths, 205 confirmed illnesses, and a virtual 
shutdown of the spinach industry in the United States—to the tune of 
$100 million in economic damages.109 And just three months later, in 
December, an E. coli outbreak eventually traced back to Salinas 
Valley bagged lettuce used at Taco Bell and Taco John’s restaurants 
resulted in another seventy-one confirmed illnesses and fifty-three 
hospitalizations.110 
In a September 2008 report calling on the FDA to address the issue 
of fresh produce safety, the United States Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) specifically cited the 2006 spinach outbreak as an 
example of how foodborne illness outbreaks can “undermine 
consumer confidence in the safety of the nation’s food supply and 
have serious economic consequences.”111 The report’s focus is 
evident from its bolded title—”Food Safety: Improvements Needed in 
FDA Oversight of Fresh Produce”—yet the outbreaks continued and 
the government failed to directly address this issue. In July 2009, for 
example, a Salinas-based grower recalled 22,000 cases of lettuce 
shipped to twenty-nine states after a random sample by the Wisconsin 
Department of Agriculture tested positive for Salmonella.112 
So what makes leafy greens particularly susceptible to bacterial 
outbreaks? The question is important, because while produce is 
responsible for a significant number of bacterial outbreaks, it is not 
 
107 Cohen, supra note 36, at 21. 
108 Id. 
109 GAO FRESH PRODUCE REPORT, supra note 77, at 1. 
110 Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Multistate Outbreak of E. 
coli O157 Infections, November–December 2006 (Dec. 14, 2006), available at 
http://www2a.cdc.gov/HAN/ArchiveSys/ViewMsgV.asp?AlertNum=00256. 
111 GAO FRESH PRODUCE REPORT, supra note 77, at 1. 
112 Karina Rusk, Tanimura and Antle Lettuce Recall Expanded, ABC7 NEWS (July 23, 
2009), http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/state&id=6930422. 
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the ultimate source of those bacteria—rather, it is merely a carrier.113 
Bacteria such as E. coli and Salmonella grow primarily in the lower 
intestines of warm-blooded organisms,114 where they can grow either 
with or without oxygen. Virulent, illness-causing strains of these 
bacteria can be transmitted outside of the body of the host, most 
commonly through the expulsion of fecal matter,115 where they can 
survive for varying periods of time. While fecal matter can come into 
contact with fresh produce in a number of different ways—including 
through infected workers, unclean containers or tools used in the 
harvesting or packing process, and even the droppings of wild 
animals that wander onto production fields—one of the major sources 
of pathogenic bacteria is manure from large beef cattle feedlots.116 
Therefore, any type of produce—including leafy greens—is 
immediately susceptible to bacterial contamination simply because it 
is grown on an open field. Moreover, fresh greens are most often 
“consumed raw, without cooking or other treatment that would 
reduce, control, or eliminate pathogens prior to consumption.”117 Yet 
another reason for leafy greens’ susceptibility to bacteria is the 
stubborn nature of the pathogens themselves. Several studies have 
shown that pathogens such as E. coli are particularly effective at 
adhering to the outer skin of lettuce leaves and infiltrating cuts left by 
coring devices used in field harvest, thereby reducing the 
effectiveness of chlorine washes designed to reduce the risk of 
 
113 The point is worth emphasizing, since many media reports have incorrectly implied 
that fresh vegetables are the “source” of foodborne illness outbreaks. NATIONAL 
SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE COALITION, FOOD SAFETY ON THE FARM: POLICY BRIEF 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2009) [hereinafter NSAC REPORT], available at 
http://sustainableagriculture.net/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/NSAC-Food-Safety-Policy   
-Brief-October-2009.pdf. 
114 Salmonella, which is closely related to the Escherichia genus, can be found in cold-
blooded organisms as well. Id. 
115 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GUIDE TO MINIMIZE 
MICROBIAL FOOD SAFETY HAZARDS OF FRESH-CUT FRUITS AND VEGETABLES 2 (2008) 
[hereinafter FDA FRESH-CUT PRODUCE GUIDE], available at http://www.fda.gov/food 
/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidancedocuments/produceandplanproducts 
/ucm064458.htm (“The major source of microbial contamination of fresh produce is 
indirect or direct contact with animal or human feces.”). 
116 NSAC REPORT, supra note 113, at 4 (“Beef cattle finished on grain in crowded 
feedlots have been shown to shed much larger numbers of pathogenic strains of E. coli 
than grass-fed cattle on well-managed pasture . . . . These virulent . . . microbes can and do 
find their way into produce fields through manure, dust, runoff, or contaminated 
waterways that carry pathogens into irrigation and wash water.”). 
117 GAO FRESH PRODUCE REPORT, supra note 77, at 1. 
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contamination.118 Clearly, then, it is not possible to grow leafy greens 
that are completely immune from contamination, and even small 
farmers who maintain meticulously clean fields must worry about 
bacterial contamination. 
Cut and processed leafy greens are especially ripe for bacterial 
contamination because the value-added mixing and bagging process 
adds several additional opportunities for pathogens to be introduced 
into the produce. The first opportunity for contamination has to do 
with the nature of the product itself. The goal of conventional food 
processing is the long-term safety and stability of the product, and so 
the preservation process typically includes a “kill step”—generally 
freezing, pasteurizing, canning, or irradiation—designed to eradicate 
harmful bacteria and “stop[] all biological activity of the food.”119 
Fresh-cut processing, by contrast, involves “the atypical processing 
goal of delivering still-living plant tissue in a ready-to-eat, appealing 
form to consumers” without such a kill step.120 Because chlorine 
rinses are not typically sufficient to kill pathogens,121 the result is that 
any E. coli and Salmonella bacteria contained on leafy greens remain 
alive throughout the fresh-cut preparation process. Second, the 
cutting, peeling, and washing methods involved in leafy greens 
processing present additional risks of bacterial contamination. The 
cutting and chopping of greens increases the risk of microbial 
contamination in three ways: (1) by breaking the exterior skin of the 
greens, which serves as a protective barrier;122 (2) by releasing plant 
cellular fluids, which “provide[] a nutritive medium in which 
pathogens, if present, can survive or grow;”123 and (3) by subjecting 
the greens to additional human handling and contact. Third, the 
aggregation and commingling of multiple kinds of leafy greens from 
various sources increases the statistical probability of bacterial 
 
118 Ready to Eat or Not? Examining the Impact of Leafy Green Marketing Agreements: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and 
Government Reform,111th Cong. 3 (2009) (statement of Carolyn Smith DeWaal, Director 
of Food Safety, Center for Science in the Public Interest) [hereinafter DeWaal Testimony], 
available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/pdfs/20090729DeWaal.pdf. 
119 Cohen, supra note 36, at 6. 
120 Id. 
121 DeWaal Testimony, supra note 118, at 3. 
122 FDA FRESH CUT PRODUCE GUIDE, supra note 115, at 1. 
123 Id. 
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contamination.124 Finally, the long transportation chains needed to 
move fresh-cut greens from field to processing plant to retail outlets 
are an especially important area of potential bacterial contamination. 
As noted above, because fresh-cut processing does not use a kill step 
to remove harmful bacteria, curbing pathogen growth during the 
transport process depends critically upon maintaining a “cold chain” 
for the leafy greens.125 
The risks associated with the fresh-cut production process are 
simply not present in the case of uncut, fresh produce. The risks also 
suggest that leafy greens processors, transporters, and retailers, along 
with growers, share the responsibility of addressing the problem of 
leafy greens contaminated with pathogenic bacteria. It is impossible 
to overstate the importance of holding food processors accountable 
for curbing pathogenic risks present in the fresh-cut production 
process, considering that processors themselves are mainly 
responsible for assessing the safety and quality of their products. For 
example, FDA imposes no grading standards on fresh-cut produce 
and offers only nonbinding recommendations for use-by dates; 
individual processors and retail brands may decide when their 
products should be removed from grocery store shelves.126 
 
124 See Cohen, supra note 36, at 7 (“When contamination is present, it has the 
opportunity to be spread throughout an entire production lot via: contact in mixing and 
product flow, contaminated processing equipment, or contaminated wash water. A 
contaminated lot can then be shipped nation-wide.”). Further, at least one study has shown 
that pathogenic bacteria can adhere to the walls of washing machines used in the fresh-cut 
production process, thereby allowing sporadic transfer to any uncontaminated greens 
placed in the machine. DeWaal Testimony, supra note 118, at 4. 
125 See Cohen, supra note 36, at 7 (“Any break in the temperature of a fresh-cut product 
at any step in the marketing chain increases the risk of contamination, unlike 
conventionally processed products.”); see also FDA testimony, Ready to Eat or Not? 
Examining the Impact of Leafy Green Marketing Agreements: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 
111th Cong. 6 (testimony of Michael R. Taylor, Senior Advisor to the Commissioner, 
FDA) [hereinafter Taylor Testimony], available at http://oversight.house.gov/images 
/stories/Hearings/pdfs/20090729Taylor.pdf (“Storage temperature and length of storage 
time of ready-to-eat leafy greens are of critical importance for the control of bacterial 
pathogens and ultimately the safety of these products.”). Studies have shown that cold 
chains are particularly susceptible to temperature increases in two places: upon leaving the 
processing plant for long-distance transportation and in retail storage coolers before sale. 
Cohen, supra note 36, at 7. 
126 Cohen, supra note 36, at 8. 
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C.  Food Safety as Perceived by Consumers: Standards and Brands 
The risks associated with the consumption of leafy greens are so 
considerable that the Center for Science in the Public Interest placed 
leafy greens atop their 2009 list of the “10 riskiest foods regulated by 
the Food and Drug Administration.”127 However, there is no way for 
consumers to know whether the salad they serve with dinner is 
objectively safe. This is so for several reasons: First and most 
obviously, the undesirable safety aspect of leafy greens—microbial 
contamination—is not visible to the human eye, meaning that 
consumers cannot make objective safety assessments of individual 
produce the way they can with other products, such as cars.128 Second 
is the problem of informational asymmetry: Producers usually know 
whether their food is generally “safe”—if they do not know whether a 
particular batch of leafy greens is contaminated, at least they know 
“what safety procedures are maintained in their plants and whether 
their procedures surpass, meet, or fall below industry standards.”129 
Consumers, however, generally are not very knowledgeable about 
how food is produced, what it contains, or measures that industry can 
or must take to keep it free from microbial contamination.130 In fact, 
most of what consumers know about food safety is reactive, in that 
“well-publicized outbreaks may be many consumers’ sole source of 
safety information.”131 In sum, consumers do not know whether the 
particular spinach they’re eating is contaminated with E. coli; they 
mainly just have to trust that it is not contaminated.132 
This is not to say that consumers do not have reliable indicators of 
food safety, thereby increasing their trust in certain products. One of 
 
127 Leafy Greens, Eggs, and Tuna Top List of Riskiest FDA-Regulated Food, CENTER 
FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.cspinet.org/new 
/200910061.html. 
128 For example, an SUV with eight airbags is objectively safer than a small 
subcompact with two airbags. 
129 ELISE GOLAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., FOOD 
SAFETY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EVIDENCE FROM THE MEAT INDUSTRY 6 
(2004), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/aer831/aer831c.pdf. 
130 Id. at 7. 
131 Id. 
132 See Denis W. Stearns, On (Cr)edibility: Why Food in the United States May Never 
Be Safe, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 248–49 (2010) (describing food safety as a 
“credence attribute” that cannot be measured or evaluated by consumers). 
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these indicators is a government stamp of approval on a product.133 
Another reliable indicator is a brand name: Just as many car buyers 
think of Volvo when the word “safety” is mentioned, “food 
companies can . . . come to develop a reputation for higher quality 
over time, and thus brand names can come to serve as proxies for the 
more specific attribute of safety.”134 
However, branding as a reasonable proxy for food safety is 
difficult for the leafy greens industry for two reasons. First, lettuce 
and its leafy brethren are raw agricultural commodities, which, 
because they are “unchanging through time,” cannot be distinguished 
by brand.135 From a consumer’s perspective, apples are apples are 
apples—though they might be safer to eat than oranges. Therefore, 
commodities such as leafy greens must maintain a good image as a 
whole, including every kind of value-added form that the commodity 
may take, whether whole, fresh-cut, or frozen.136 However, media and 
even regulatory reaction to food safety outbreaks is often overly-
reactive, at times implicating entire categories of produce for 
foodborne illnesses that eventually are traced to just one farm or 
processing plant.137 
Some leafy greens handlers change their commodities into food 
products such as bagged salad, which allows for branding possibilities 
and thus the establishment of a reputation for food safety. But the 
 
133 For example, in a study conducted by the California Leafy Greens Marketing 
Agreement (CLGMA), participants were told that certain produce buyers (such as grocery 
stores) sourced their leafy greens only from CLGMA signatories that passed mandatory 
government audits; eighty-eight percent said that this increased their confidence in the 
product. NATIONAL LEAFY GREENS MARKETING AGREEMENT, JUSTIFICATION OF 
PROPOSED MARKETING AGREEMENT FOR LEAFY GREEN VEGETABLES § 5 (2009), 
available at http://www.nlgma.org/documents/9pointsofJustification.pdf. 
134 Stearns, supra note 132, at 256. 
135 Daniel I. Padberg & Charles Hall, The Economic Rationale for Marketing Orders, 5 
SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 73, 82–83 (1995). 
136 Id. at 83. 
137 In the midst of the September 2006 spinach outbreak, the FDA issued four warnings 
to consumers in the span of six days. The first, on September 14th, advised consumers to 
“not eat bagged fresh spinach;” by the 17th the FDA had expanded its directive to “fresh 
spinach or fresh spinach-containing products that are consumed raw.” Cohen, supra note 
36, at 24. The next day, the FDA dropped the distinction between raw spinach and cooked 
spinach, flatly advising consumers “not to eat fresh spinach or fresh spinach-containing 
products until further notice.” Id. at 25 (emphasis omitted). It was not until the 20th that 
FDA issued a notice clarifying that “frozen spinach, canned spinach and spinach included 
in pre-made meals” was safe to eat. Id. Faced with this breathless set of directives, it’s 
little wonder that confused and nervous consumers simply stopped eating spinach 
altogether. 
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problem here is that very few leafy greens industry players are able to 
create brands for their products. Most growers cannot; their output is 
raw agricultural commodities, which as noted above, typically cannot 
be successfully branded. And most handlers and processors cannot 
either, since they typically act only as middlemen who receive raw 
agricultural commodities and process and package them for sale 
under someone else’s brand.138 That leaves only two leafy greens 
industry players with branding opportunities: the very largest handlers 
and processors such as Fresh Express who, as noted earlier, exercise 
significant market control, and retailers such as Publix and Walmart. 
These groups, of course, are the largest and most powerful players in 
the market for leafy greens. 
Therefore, stakeholders in the leafy greens industry can pursue 
consumer trust in leafy greens safety in one of two ways: (1) they can 
try to raise the safety level of the leafy greens industry as a whole, if 
they cannot distinguish their product by brand, or (2) they can 
develop and impose their own safety standards, if they can distinguish 
their product by brand. It is important to keep this point in mind as 
this Article examines the efforts the leafy greens industry took to 
increase safety in the wake of the 2006 E. coli outbreaks. 
D.  The FDA’s Efforts to Address the Safety 
of Leafy Greens Produce 
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) assigns 
primary responsibility for the safety of fruits and vegetables to the 
FDA.139 Pursuant to this authority, the FDA may issue food safety 
regulations, inspect and investigate growing and processing facilities, 
and recommend Department of Justice enforcement actions against 
violators.140 The FDA also has the authority to take measures aimed at 
controlling the spread of diseases, including detaining food products 
if they present a threat of “serious adverse health consequences.”141 
 
138 See, e.g., Leafy Green Vegetables in the United States: Hearing on Proposed 
Marketing Agreement No. 970 Before the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2 (Oct. 24, 2009) 
(testimony of Laura Giudici Mills), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0 
/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5079852 (noting that the handler Metz Fresh “contract[s] 
with a co-packer to process, package and vacuum-cool and/or freeze our fresh and frozen 
leafy green crops”). 
139 GAO FRESH PRODUCE REPORT, supra note 77, at 2. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 8. 
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However, the FDA has no formal program for regulating the safety of 
fresh produce, and therefore must allocate its scarce resources to leafy 
greens safety efforts as part of its overall food safety planning 
process.142 The 2010 FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) 
attempts to correct the jurisdictional deficiency of the FFDCA.143 The 
amendment, to be codified at section 419, directs the FDA to issue 
rules establishing production and harvesting standards for fruits and 
vegetables to minimize the risk of foodborne illness.144 
Though the FDA considers fresh produce safety to be a top 
priority,145 the agency has been hobbled by diversions such as 
counterterrorism efforts and food safety outbreaks, as well as “serious 
deficiencies in agency funding, staffing, and authority.”146 As a result, 
the FDA allots only about three percent of its annual food safety 
budget and about four percent of its manpower to food safety efforts in 
the produce sector as a whole147—to say nothing about resources 
targeted towards the safety of leafy green produce. The FDA’s meager 
produce safety resources are stretched even more thinly by the 
burgeoning U.S. food system, which has grown in both size and 
complexity in recent years to meet consumer demand. Moreover, 
rapidly consolidating food companies commingle produce from farms 
across the United States at a few regional processing plants, use value-
added processes such as bagging to extend the shelf life of the 
produce, and then scatter the produce across the globe by way of long, 
interconnected distribution networks. Larger volumes, longer supply 
chains, and extended shelf life times “make trace-back more difficult 
and put a larger number of consumers at risk.”148 These challenges 
have hampered the FDA’s efforts to establish a federal safety protocol 
for the handling of fresh produce, including leafy greens—even though 
the agency has clearly recognized the risk associated with these 
 
142 Id. at 11. 
143 See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, S. 510, 111th Cong. § 105 (2010). 
144 Id.; H.R. 2751 § 105, 111th Cong. (2011). 
145 GAO FRESH PRODUCE REPORT, supra note 77, at 11. 
146 ELANOR STARMER & MARIE KULICK, FOOD & WATER WATCH, INST. FOR AGRIC. 
& TRADE POLICY, BRIDGING THE GAPS: STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE PRODUCE SAFETY, 
PRESERVE FARM DIVERSITY, AND STRENGTHEN LOCAL FOOD SYSTEMS 1 (2009), 
available at http://www.iatp.org/iatp/publications.cfm?refid=106746. 
147 Id. The GAO notes that the FDA has only two full-time staff members who devote 
their time exclusively to the issue of fresh produce safety, GAO FRESH PRODUCE REPORT, 
supra note 77, at 17, and that overall food safety staffing levels declined seventeen percent 
between 2003 and 2007. Id. at 19. 
148 STARMER & KULICK, supra note 146, at 2. 
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products, and even though the FDA has previously issued regulations 
outlining safety measures for other high-risk foods, such as seafood149 
and processed juice.150 And although the FSMA provides the FDA 
explicit authority to implement regulations for fresh produce, it 
remains to be seen if Congress will provide the agency the necessary 
financial resources to close this food safety gap.151 
Though the FDA has not issued any binding regulations dealing 
with fresh produce safety, it has undertaken several efforts that have 
resulted in nonbinding recommendations for leafy greens growers, 
handlers, and processors. In 1998, the FDA, in cooperation with the 
USDA, issued “Guidance for Industry: Guide to Minimize Microbial 
Food Safety Hazards for Fresh Fruits and Vegetables” (hereinafter 
GAP Guide),152 which stands as the agencies’ most authoritative and 
comprehensive statement to date on the topic of produce safety.153 
 
149 Procedures for the Safe and Sanitary Processing and Importing of Fish and Fishery 
Products, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,095 (Dec. 18, 1995) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 123 and 1240). 
150 Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HAACP); Procedures for the Safe and 
Sanitary Processing and Importing of Juice, 66 Fed. Reg. 6137 (Jan. 19, 2001) (codified at 
21 C.F.R. pt. 120). 
151 See Lyndsey Layton, Food Safety Overhaul Faces Obstacles, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 
2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/24/AR201012240 
2748.html (noting that the recently passed Food Safety Modernization Act “will take years 
to implement and could be undercut by Republicans who don’t want to fund an expansion 
of the Food and Drug Administration”). 
152 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY: GUIDE TO MINIMIZE MICROBIAL FOOD SAFETY HAZARDS FOR FRESH 
FRUITS AND VEGETABLES (1998) [hereinafter GAP GUIDE], available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation 
/GuidanceDocuments/ProduceandPlanProducts/UCM169112.pdf. 
153 While the voluntary GAPs remain the FDA’s primary means of regulating fresh 
produce safety, it has undertaken a few additional initiatives that specifically address the 
safety of leafy greens. In 2004, the agency launched its Produce Safety Action Plan, which 
consisted mainly of a set of general goals and objectives aimed at reducing the incidence of 
foodborne illness in produce. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FDA, 
PRODUCE SAFETY FROM PRODUCTION TO CONSUMPTION: 2004 ACTION PLAN TO 
MINIMIZE FOODBORNE ILLNESS ASSOCIATED WITH FRESH PRODUCE CONSUMPTION, (Oct. 
2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/Product-SpecificInformation 
/FruitsVegetablesJuices/FDAProduceSafetyActivities/ProduceSafetyActionPlan/ucm12948
7.htm. As part of this action plan, the FDA launched a multiyear “Lettuce Safety 
Initiative” in 2006 that targeted the state of California as a “geographic region historically 
associated with outbreaks.” U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., FDA, LETTUCE 
SAFETY INITIATIVE (May 20, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety 
/Product-SpecificInformation/FruitsVegetablesJuices/FDAProduceSafetyActivities/ucm 
115906.htm. The agency partnered with California’s Departments of Health Services and 
Food and Agriculture in order to review bacterial outbreak data in lettuce and inspect 
farms, packing facilities, and processors while focusing on GAPs and GMPs. Id. The FDA  
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The GAP Guide, which generally addresses the “the growing, 
harvesting, sorting, packing, and distribution of fresh produce,”154 
identifies seven major areas of concern for fresh produce safety: 
water, manure and municipal biosolids, worker health and hygiene, 
sanitary facilities, field sanitation, packing facility sanitation, and 
transportation.155 It then identifies “the broad microbial hazards 
associated with each area of concern, the scientific basis of that 
concern, and good agricultural and management practices for 
reducing the risk of microbial contamination in fresh produce.”156 The 
guide encourages growers and handlers to adopt these “good 
agricultural practices” (GAPs) and “good manufacturing practices” 
(GMPs) as part of their day-to-day operations. 
There is a way to turn the GAP Guide into somewhat of a binding 
requirement, though it has little to do with the FDA. In response to 
requests from industry for a quality control program, the USDA’s 
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) has established the GAP and 
good handling practices (GHP) Fresh Produce Audit Verification 
Program, which verifies continuing adherence to the GAP Guide.157 
Farmers and processors may voluntarily sign up for the audit 
program, but if they do, AMS requires their signature on an 
agreement that authorizes USDA auditors or state department of 
 
subsequently expanded this Lettuce Safety Initiative in 2007 by renaming it the “Leafy 
Greens Safety Initiative” and broadening the scope of the program to include additional 
greens such as spinach. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, FDA, LEAFY 
GREENS SAFETY INITIATIVE—2ND YEAR (May 20, 2009), available at http://www.fda 
.gov/Food/FoodSafety/Product-SpecificInformation/FruitsVegetablesJuices/FDAProduce 
SafetyActivities/ucm115898.htm. This effort included visits to California farms “to assess 
the prevalence of factors in and near the field environment which may contribute to 
potential contamination of leafy greens with E. coli O157:H7 and the extent to which 
Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs) and other preventive controls are being 
implemented.” Id. Findings from this multiyear leafy greens safety initiative will be 
published and implemented in forthcoming GAPs guidance as appropriate. U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GUIDE TO MINIMIZE 
MICROBIAL FOOD SAFETY HAZARDS OF LEAFY GREENS; DRAFT GUIDANCE (July 2009), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation 
/GuidanceDocuments/ProduceandPlanProducts/ucm174200.htm. Of course, none of these 
efforts amount to a comprehensive regulatory scheme for decreasing the risk of microbial 
contamination in leafy greens. 
154 GAP GUIDE, supra note 152, at 3. 
155 Id. at ii–iii. 
156 Id. at 9. 
157 Agric. Mktg. Serv., Grading, Certification, and Verification, Fresh Produce Audit 
Verification Program, USDA, http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplate 
Data.do?template=TemplateN&page=GAPGHPAuditVerificationProgram (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2011). 
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agriculture employees working under a cooperative agreement to 
enter the farm or facility for scheduled, unscheduled, and follow-up 
audits.158 Auditors use checklists to document compliance with the 
GAP Guide, and they are obligated to report observed food safety 
risks to the appropriate authorities or the FDA.159 Since the inception 
of auditing services in 1999, AMS has conducted more than 4,000 
audits on 100 commodities in forty-five states, and USDA officials 
have noted that industry demand for GAP and GHP verification 
programs has increased.160 The USDA audit programs, however, are 
at best a limited solution to the problem of leafy greens food safety, in 
no small part because of their voluntary nature and weak-kneed 
sanctions for non-complying facilities.161 And if the FDA and 
USDA’s coordination on the issue of egg inspection is any indication, 
the promised agency coordination in reporting food safety hazards 
sounds better on paper than it actually works in practice.162 
At any rate, the FDA document upon which the AMS audits are 
based—the GAP Guide—has engendered its own share of criticism 
from both policymakers and industry leaders. First, the best practices 
outlined in the GAP Guide are voluntary, even if confirmed through a 
formal audit program. Second, they are not specific to leafy greens, 
nor do they offer “any quantitative or measurable criteria upon which 
to base an audit.”163 This means that the GAP Guide may recommend 
testing a water source, but it does not specify “what to test for, what 
type of test to utilize, where to test, what the frequency of tests should 
 
158 Leafy Green Vegetables in the United States: Hearing on Proposed Marketing 
Agreement No. 970 Before the U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (last modified Jan. 11, 2011) 
(testimony of Anthony Souza at 4) (hereinafter Souza Testimony), available at 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5080328. The audit 
itself “consists of a physical visit to the farm and/or facility which involves a review of 
records and documentation, interviews of employees, observation of practices, and a 
closing meeting.” Id. 
159 Id. at 4. 
160 Id. at 3. 
161 Companies that participate in the Fresh Produce Audit Verification Program are 
listed by state and commodity on AMS’s website. If a participating company or farm 
flunks an audit, “the company’s information will be removed from the website until a 
follow-up audit is conducted by AMS verifying that effective corrective actions have been 
taken.” Souza Testimony, supra note 158, at 4. 
162 See infra notes 335–341 and accompanying text (discussing communication 
problems between FDA and USDA with respect to the SE outbreak in 2010). 
163 Q & A Session for NLGMA Proponent Group Presentation, National Leafy Greens 
Marketing Agreement Proponent Group 2 (Aug. 19, 2009), available at http://www.nlgma 
.org/documents/090819QA.pdf. 
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be or any parameters upon which to evaluate the results of tests.”164 
Policymakers have criticized the GAP Guide for failing to “place 
sufficient emphasis on the risk posed to fresh produce by beef and 
dairy cattle operations,” especially because cattle are the main source 
of the E. coli 0157:H7 bacteria in an agricultural setting.165 Even 
though the FDA acknowledges in the GAP Guide that “the scientific 
basis for reducing . . . pathogens in an agricultural setting is evolving 
and not yet complete . . . ,”166 the agency has not revised the GAP 
Guide since its introduction in 1998. In 2008, the FDA announced 
plans to update its produce GAPs and solicited public commentary on 
the issue; by July 2009 it had issued a revised draft version of the 
GAP Guide for additional public comment,167 but to date has not yet 
issued a final version. 
Finally, the scope of the FDA’s GAP Guide is limited to common 
food safety hazards in the “growing, harvesting, washing, sorting, 
packing, and transporting of most fruits and vegetables . . . in an 
unprocessed or minimally processed (raw) form.”168 The GAP Guide, 
therefore, does not address the significant risks inherent in the fresh-
cut production process. The FDA has addressed food processing risks 
both by regulation and by nonbinding guidance, but as discussed 
below, the efforts do not adequately address the problem of microbial 
contamination in leafy greens. 
E.  Lack of Private Regulation in the Leafy Greens Industry 
Just as the federal government has largely failed to adequately 
regulate the safety of leafy greens, commentators have repeatedly 
 
164 Id. That criticism appears to be fair enough: In the section titled “Microbial testing 
of agricultural water,” the bulk of the GAP Guide’s best practices advice is this: 
Growers may elect to test their water supply for microbial contamination on a 
periodic basis, using standard indicators of fecal pollution, such as E. coli tests, 
which may be performed by commercial, State, or local government laboratories. 
However, bacterial safety of water does not necessarily indicate the absence of 
protozoa and viruses . . . . Growers can consult local water quality experts, such as 
state or local Environmental Protection or Public Health agencies, extension agents 
or land grant universities, for advice appropriate for individual operations. 
GAP GUIDE, supra note 152, at 12–13. 
165 STARMER & KULICK, supra note 146, at 4. 
166 GAP GUIDE, supra note 152, at 3. 
167 FDA, Guidance for Industry: Guide to Minimize Microbial Food Safety Hazards of 
Leafy Greens; Draft Guidance, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., (July 2009), 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments 
/ProduceandPlanProducts/ucm174200.htm. 
168 GAP GUIDE, supra note 152, at 1 (emphasis added). 
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characterized the lack of private safety efforts in the leafy greens 
industry as a market failure.169 Some have characterized food safety 
as a “weaker-link public good” in which free riders in the industry are 
able to benefit from and therefore diminish the value of the safety 
efforts of other firms in the industry.170 It is also true that the 
informational asymmetries in the food industry allow firms to 
externalize the cost of food safety to consumers, who must pay 
medical bills if they get sick. Because the market rewards those who 
cut back on safety efforts or free-ride on the efforts of others, one 
commentator has noted that “[w]hen market controls are inefficient 
and ineffective at producing the level of safety desired by consumers, 
the common approach has been to require firms to meet regulatory 
requirements for design or process standards.”171 But as we have seen, 
the government has done no such thing, perhaps in part because 
consumer demand for enhanced food safety controls directly 
correlates with food safety outbreaks.172 Also, until recently, 
contamination in leafy greens had not been a big problem—or at the 
very least, not a well-publicized one. 
The 2006 E. coli outbreaks described in Part B, supra, spurred calls 
for change in the leafy greens industry. These calls came not just from 
policymakers such as the GAO, but also from the industry itself—in 
no small part because the same news reports that kept running totals 
of illnesses caused by leafy greens also characterized the leafy 
industry as being primarily self-regulated with inadequate oversight 
from the FDA.173 As one industry player subsequently admitted to 
 
169 See, e.g., Stearns, supra note 132, at 247 (“A free market for safe food in the United 
States is impossible because there are no set of circumstances under which a free market 
could exist in which the food bought and sold there could be safe, and reliably known as 
such at the time of purchase”); Fortin, supra note 32, at 574 (“It is well documented that 
the market provides incomplete information on a product’s risk of inducing foodborne 
illness . . . . This market inefficiency creates an underproduction of food safety that a fully 
functional and competitive market would produce.”). 
170 Proponent Group’s Brief in Support of a Federal Marketing Agreement for Leafy 
Green Vegetables at 10, Leafy Green Vegetables in the United States: Hearing on 
Proposed Marketing Agreement No. 970 Before the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. AO-FV-09-
0138, available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC 
5082273 [hereinafter NLGMA Proponent Group’s Brief]. 
171 Fortin, supra note 32, at 578. 
172 Golan, supra note 129, at 7–8 (“[D]ramatic and highly publicized outbreaks have 
often driven sharp increases in demand for safety, at least in the short run.”). 
173 See, e.g., Marian Burros, E. Coli Fears Inspire a Call for Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 9, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/09/nyregion/09produce.html (describing 
the leafy greens industry’s “newfound enthusiasm for regulation”). 
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Congress, “in the aftermath of the 2006 outbreak, farmers, shippers 
and processors [of leafy greens] recognized that more effort was 
needed to protect public health. The question was how to do it.”174 As 
it turned out, the major players in the leafy greens industry—growers, 
handlers and processors, and retailers—had different answers to that 
question. Handlers and processors of leafy greens turned to a quasi-
governmental solution—a marketing agreement—while retailers 
favored private regulation. In this section, this Article explores the 
reasons for those choices, as well as the implications that each choice 
has had for food safety regulation in the United States. 
1.  Retailer Response—Super-metrics 
In the wake of the leafy greens outbreak, many businesses that sell 
leafy greens to end users—in particular, supermarkets, restaurants, 
and institutional food service providers—implemented their own best 
practice metrics, which must be followed by growers who supply 
produce to these companies. Because these requirements are often 
stricter than those imposed by the FDA’s GAP Guide or industry 
marketing agreements as discussed below, they have been called 
super-metrics.175 These super-metrics are of particular concern to 
growers, handlers, and processors of leafy greens in no small part 
because of the secrecy that surrounds their promulgation and 
enforcement. While the Food Safety Leadership Council (FSLC)—a 
consortium of the country’s largest retail produce buyers, including 
Darden Restaurants, McDonald’s, Publix Super Markets, Walmart, 
and the Walt Disney Company—has made their super-metrics public, 
“many companies’ standards are considered a trade secret and are 
therefore confidential.”176 
Because of the secretive nature of these agreements, it is difficult to 
assess just how many companies are using them, though “anecdotal 
evidence shows that the number is large and growing.”177 More 
 
174 Ready to Eat or Not? Examining the Impact of Leafy Green Marketing Agreements: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. of Oversight and 
Government Reform,111th Cong. 1 (statement of E. Scott Horsfall, CEO Cal. Leafy Green 
Products Handler Marketing Agreement), available at http://oversight.house.gov/images 
/stories/Hearings/pdfs/20090729Horsfall.pdf. 
175 Shermain Hardesty & Yoko Kusunose, UC Small Farm Program Research Brief, 
Growers’ Compliance Costs for the Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement and Other Food 
Safety Programs at 4 (2009), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile 
?dDocName=STELPRDC5079865. 
176 STARMER & KULICK, supra note 146, at 6. 
177 Id. at 2. 
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worrisome is the fact that objective observers are not able to assess or 
call into question the underlying scientific research upon which the 
metrics are based. Many metrics that have been publicized appear to be 
stricter than those suggested by the GAP Guide or mandated by 
industry-government marketing agreement partnerships, with many 
taking a sterile farm approach to growing produce that requires growers 
to strip all non-crop vegetation from the perimeter of growing fields 
because such vegetation can attract and harbor wild animals that carry 
pathogenic bacteria.178 Several scientific studies have shown, however, 
that natural vegetation surrounding growing fields can in fact reduce 
the possibility of bacterial contamination by providing a filtering barrier 
that protects against bacteria carried by dust or water runoff.179 While 
the science of field contamination remains incomplete, such conflicting 
reports emphasize the need for transparent standards that can be 
evaluated independently by the public and policymakers—something 
that many super-metrics agreements simply do not provide. 
2.  Processor and Handler Response—Marketing Agreements 
Even as the fallout from the 2006 E. coli outbreaks in leafy greens 
continued to make headlines, industry leaders publicly announced 
plans for “an agreement that would call for a formal system of farm 
inspections, regulations of water and soil quality and sanitation and 
even cease-and-desist orders for violations.”180 Early press reports 
stressed the mandatory nature of the agreement: “Anyone who 
ignores this will be out of business,” an industry group representative 
told the New York Times in December 2006.181 Oddly enough, 
however, the agreement spoken of at the height of the E. coli crisis 
eventually took the form of a voluntary public-private marketing 
agreement among industry players and regulators—one that created 
its own rules and was enforced mainly by the industry itself. 
 
178 Id. at 6. For example, the California Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement, discussed 
in more detail infra, requires growing fields to be, at minimum, 30 feet from animal 
grazing areas and 400 feet from animal feedlots. Hardesty & Kusunose, supra note 175, at 
4, n.5. However, the FSLC’s standards are much stricter, requiring a minimum quarter-
mile buffer between growing and grazing areas and a full mile between growing fields and 
animal feedlots. Id. 
179 STARMER & KULICK, supra note 146, at 2. 
180 Burros, supra note 173. 
181 Id. 
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Basically, marketing agreements are agreements among certain 
industry players—primarily growers, handlers, and processors—to 
establish best practice metrics for the safe handling of a particular 
product. They are generally approved by a federal or state regulatory 
body that typically acts under the authority of legislation that enables 
the creation of such agreements. Agreement buy-in is voluntary, but 
the agreement metrics become mandatory and binding once a party 
becomes a signatory to the agreement. 
In the spring of 2007, just months after the second E. coli outbreak 
in leafy greens had subsided, the first of these agreements came to 
fruition. The California Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement 
(LGMA), promulgated under authority of the California Marketing 
Act of 1937,182 is an agreement between leafy greens handlers in 
California. The LGMA prescribes best practices for agricultural 
growers of fourteen different kinds of leafy greens183 in five main 
areas of risk: growing environment, soil amendments, water, worker 
practices, and field sanitation; and is enforced through periodic and 
random audits conducted by the California Department of 
Agriculture.184 Though the agreement is signed by handlers and 
processors of leafy greens, the metrics affect growers: Many 
compliance requirements, such as soil testing and field barriers, are 
implemented at the field level, and signatory handlers pledge not to 
source greens from growers not in compliance with the LGMA.185 
The agreement is funded by signatories, who pay a 1.5-cent 
assessment per 24-pound carton of produce processed.186 Two years 
after the LGMA was approved by the state of California, more than 
100 handlers—together representing ninety-nine percent of the 
volume of leafy greens produced in the state—have signed onto the 
LGMA.187 A similar agreement is in place in Arizona,188 and the two 
 
182 California Marketing Act of 1937, 21 Cal. Food & Agric. Code §§ 58601–58624.  
183 In alphabetical order: arugula, baby leaf lettuce, butter lettuce, cabbage (green, red, 
and savoy), chard, endive, escarole, green leaf lettuce, iceberg lettuce, kale, red leaf 
lettuce, romaine lettuce, spinach, and spring mix. About Us, CALIFORNIA LEAFY GREENS 
MARKETING AGREEMENT, http://www.caleafygreens.ca.gov/about-us (last visited Apr. 21, 
2011). 
184 Hardesty & Kusunose, supra note 175, at 2. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 About Us, CALIFORNIA LEAFY GREENS MARKETING AGREEMENT, 
http://www.caleafygreens.ca.gov/about-us (last visited Apr. 21, 2011). Notably, some of 
the largest handlers of leafy greens—in particular, the ones who have established their 
own fresh-cut brands—signed on to the LGMA but still imposed standards that went  
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agreements combined cover nearly ninety percent of all the leafy 
greens grown in the United States.189 
Despite this success, major players in the leafy greens industry 
pushed for a marketing agreement that replicates the California and 
Arizona agreements on a national scale. In 2009, a group of leafy 
greens trade associations (hereinafter NLGMA Proponent Group)190 
submitted a petition to the Department of Agriculture asking the 
Secretary to use his authority under the Agricultural Marketing 
Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA) to establish a national leafy greens 
marketing agreement (NLGMA) applicable to leafy greens handlers 
across the United States.191 Before describing the particulars of this 
proposed marketing agreement, however, it is important to examine 
the context in which the AMAA was passed. The AMAA and the 
market control devices it authorizes—marketing orders and marketing 
agreements—are primarily intended as a price control mechanism 
meant to give farmers a method of colluding to ensure a fair price for 
their commodities. But as we will see, marketing agreements—and 
the NLGMA in particular—are an imperfect way to regulate food 
safety in the United States. 
3.  New Deal Farm Support Legislation: Marking Orders and 
Marketing Agreements 
Without question, the purpose of the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
of 1933 (AAA), and its reenactment as the Agricultural Marketing 
Agreement Act of 1937, was to control the price of agricultural 
 
beyond those mandated by the handler agreement. See STARMER & KULICK, supra note 
146, at 5 (Fresh Express, Chiquita’s fresh produce brand, is a signatory to the LGMA but 
uses additional requirements with its farmers). 
188 ARIZONA LEAFY GREENS MARKETING AGREEMENT, http://www.azlgma.gov/. 
189 Leafy Green Vegetables in the United States: Hearing on Proposed Marketing 
Agreement No. 970 Before the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Oct. 9, 2009 [hereinafter Giclas 
Testimony], (testimony of Hank Giclas at 1), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov 
/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5080125. 
190 In alphabetical order, the Proponent Group comprises Arizona Farm Bureau, 
Arizona Leafy Green Products Shipper Marketing Agreement, California Farm Bureau, 
California Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement, Georgia Farm Bureau, Georgia Fruit and 
Vegetable Growers Association, Grower-Shipper Association of Central California, 
Imperial Valley Vegetable Growers Association, Leafy Greens Council, Produce 
Marketing Association, Texas Vegetable Association, United Fresh Produce Association, 
and Western Growers. NLGMA Proponent Group’s Brief, supra note 170, at 1. 
191 Id. at 2. 
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commodities for the benefit of the farmers who grew them.192 The 
AAA was the result of an unprecedented economic emergency that 
depressed the price of agricultural commodities nationwide, leaving 
many farmers unable to pay their bills and therefore freezing up the 
assets of many rural banks.193 In a message to Congress, President 
Roosevelt previewed the AAA by framing it as legislation that would 
“increase the purchasing power of our farmers”194—a statement 
echoed by Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace, who, in testimony 
before Congress, stressed the administration’s view that “restoration 
of farmers’ buying power is an essential part of the program to relieve 
the present economic emergency . . . .”195 Congress’s grant of 
authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to enter into marketing 
orders and agreements with processors, associations, and producers 
under the AAA was therefore qualified by the requirement that “such 
agreements may be entered into only for the purpose of effectuating 
the declared policy of gradually establishing and maintaining such 
balance between production and consumption as will reestablish for 
agricultural commodities their pre-war purchasing power.”196 
After the AAA’s passage, a U.S. Supreme Court case, United 
States v. Butler,197 invalidated the taxing provisions of the Act, and 
subsequent lower federal court litigation cast doubt on whether the 
marketing agreement provisions could be severed from the 
unconstitutional provisions.198 Congress therefore reenacted the 
 
192 See H.R. REP. NO. 6, at 489 (1933) (“The bill seeks to establish and maintain such a 
balance between production and consumption of agricultural commodities and such 
conditions in the marketing of agricultural commodities as will give to such commodities 
sold by farmers their pre-war purchasing power.”). 
193 Id. at 494 (“The present economic emergency is in large part the result of the 
impoverished condition of agriculture and the lack of ability of farmers to purchase 
industrial commodities.”). 
194 S. REP. NO. 16, at 414 (1933). 
195 Agricultural Emergency Act to Increase Farm Purchasing Power: Hearings on H.R. 
3835 Before the S. Comm. on Agric. and Forestry, 73rd Cong. 128 (statement of Henry A. 
Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture). 
196 H.R. REP. NO. 6, at 491 (1933). While the primary purpose of the AAA was to 
benefit farmers, Congress recognized that consumers also stood to benefit from measures 
aimed at restoring the prices for agricultural commodities: So long as farmers were not 
guaranteed a “fair return to the labor and capital involved in producing the commodity,” 
agricultural prices would continue to spiral downward, “shortly [resulting] in the ruin of 
our agriculture. . . .” Id. at 494. Therefore, “[the] consumer as well as the farmer and 
businessman has everything to gain from a fair and balanced relationship between 
production and consumption . . . .” Id. 
197 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
198 See H.R. REP. NO. 468, at 30 (1937); S. REP. NO. 565 at 6 (1937). 
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marketing order and agreement provisions of the AAA as a separate 
piece of legislation—the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 
1937 (AMAA).199 Even though the economic conditions that led to 
the passage of the AAA in 1933 had improved somewhat by 1937, 
Congress recognized that “continuing and constantly recurring [price] 
disparities do exist in the case of individual farm commodities, 
accompanying and caused by disruption of orderly marketing in the 
channels of interstate and foreign commerce.”200 The AMAA 
therefore amended the AAA by inserting a policy declaration of 
Congress’s intent to give the Secretary of Agriculture the power to 
establish marketing agreements for agricultural commodities that 
would establish parity prices for farmers and consumers alike.201 To 
achieve the goal of parity pricing and orderly marketing conditions, 
the AMAA authorizes several regulatory actions, including but not 
limited to: restrictions on the quantity of a commodity entering the 
market; limits of the grade, size, or quality of a commodity; 
regulation of pack and container size; and the creation of commodity 
market research, development, and promotion programs.202 
It is also important to understand why Congress chose to give the 
Secretary of Agriculture the power to enter into marketing orders and 
agreements, which by their very nature authorize anticompetitive 
practices such as industry collusion and price-fixing. This too was 
primarily to benefit farmers, though the explanation involves a rather 
complex combination of political and socioeconomic factors. The first 
reason is simply a consequence of a large rural population. In the first 
 
199 H.R. REP. NO. 468, at 30. See also S. REP. NO. 565 at 6 (“The immediate 
reenactment of the marketing agreement and order provisions of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act would remove the technical basis upon which [court decisions questioning 
the provisions’ constitutionality] rest and enable producers to receives the benefits of such 
programs without the necessity of waiting until these cases have finally been acted upon 
by the Supreme Court.”). 
200 H. REP. NO. 468, at 31. 
201 H.R. 5722, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. (1937) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 602(1) and (2)) (“It is 
hereby declared that the disruption of the orderly exchange of commodities in interstate 
commerce impairs the purchasing power of farmers and destroys the value of agricultural 
assets which support the national credit structure and that these conditions affect 
transactions in agricultural commodities with a national public interest, and burden and 
obstruct the normal channels of interstate commerce.”). 
202 See Daniel Bensing, The Promulgation and Implementation of Federal Marketing 
Orders Regulating Fruit and Vegetable Crops Under the Agricultural Marketing 
Agreement Act of 1937, 5 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 3, 6 (1995) (citing 7 U.S.C. § 
608c(6)). 
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half of the twentieth century, many U.S. citizens, as well as 
immigrants attracted to a seemingly endless supply of cheap and 
fertile land, made their living as farmers. More farmers meant more 
saleable agricultural commodities, and the result was that commodity 
markets in the United States were chronically oversupplied.203 At the 
same time, however, the sheer number of farmers relative to the 
population as a whole gave the agricultural sector considerable voting 
power, meaning that farmers’ interests were often overrepresented in 
Congress.204 
The second reason is a matter of coordination in economic markets. 
Economists have recognized that “[i]n most free market economies or 
sectors, there will develop a balance between the component of 
economic activity coordinated by markets and situations where 
coordination works best within the firm.”205 Simply by way of their 
market power, large firms often have the ability to set the price for a 
good within a particular sector; they may also have considerable 
influence over the quality level or other characteristics of that good.206 
This market power creates stability and facilitates the orderly 
marketing of that commodity, because large firms are typically well 
established, and therefore farmers will usually know in advance the 
price they can expect to receive for their goods. 
However, in the 1930s, when Congress passed the AAA, large 
national and international agricultural commodity firms did not exist. 
Instead, prices for agricultural commodities were determined by a 
broad and diverse network of farmers scattered across the country—
most of whom were selling only locally or regionally. In the 1920s, 
some farmers successfully organized cooperatives to control 
commodity supply, establish pooled prices, and negotiate with 
handlers only on a collective basis.207 However, any sort of national 
cooperative effort by individual farmers to collectively influence 
commodity prices would prove very difficult, if not impossible. 
Therefore, “[i]t is likely that the resulting balance of public marketing 
machinery was influenced by this ‘more atomistic’ nature of traders in 
the American experience. Here the alternative to a public system of 
 
203 Padberg & Hall, supra note 135, at 73–74. 
204 Id. at 74 (“The politics of this situation favored the agricultural interests more than 
in any government in history. The participative nature of government . . . and the 
overbalancing of voters in farming was unprecedented.”). 
205 Id. at 74–75. 
206 Id. at 74. 
207 Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 173 (1969). 
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grades and standards was not a functional private one, but chaos.”208 
And indeed, “[t]he drop in commodity prices during the depression 
years destroyed the equilibrium of the 1920s and utter chaos 
ensued.”209 Recognizing that cooperatives could no longer assure 
farmers a fair price for their commodities, Congress authorized the 
Secretary of Agriculture to approve industry-led marketing orders and 
agreements to allow a large network of small “firms”—that is, 
individual farmers—to organize for their own benefit where they 
would not otherwise have been able to do so. In sum, marketing 
orders were part of the larger New Deal effort to shift the balance of 
economic power from the large aggregators in favor of the small, 
independent grower.210 Seen in that light, marketing orders and 
agreements are as much a vehicle for participative democracy as they 
are a method of control over commodity prices in any given industry. 
Given that historical background, the resulting statutory scheme is 
designed to benefit farmers. Marketing orders—after approval by the 
Secretary of Agriculture and a two-thirds vote among affected 
producers—require “agricultural producers in a designated region to 
take various actions to promote orderly marketing, such as 
influencing supply and quality and pooling funds for promotion and 
research.”211 Although similar to a marketing order, a marketing 
agreement is voluntary and only applies to entities that have signed 
the agreement.212 Either way, the Secretary has wide discretion to 
approve either type of agreement so long as the procedural 
requirements have been followed. The only limitation is a required 
finding that the order or agreement “effectuate[s] the declared policy” 
 
208 Padberg & Hall, supra note 135, at 74. 
209 Zuber, 396 U.S. at 174. 
210 Bensing, supra note 203, at 8. See also, Bailey Farm Dairy Co. v. Anderson, 157 
F.2d 87, 90 (8th Cir. 1946) (noting that the purpose of the marketing order is to benefit the 
commodity producer). For a more detailed discussion of the AMAA, See 9 NEIL E. HARL, 
AGRICULTURAL LAW §§ 70.01–07 (1993 & Supp. 1994). 
211 U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research Serv., Farm and Commodity Policy: Glossary, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FarmPolicy/glossary.htm#m (last updated Sept. 21, 
2009); see also 7 U.S.C. § 608c. 
212 7 U.S.C. § 608b (2010). See also STEPHEN A. NEFF & GERALD E. PLATO, U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., AER-707, FEDERAL MARKETING ORDERS 
AND FEDERAL RESEARCH AND PROMOTION PROGRAMS: BACKGROUND FOR 1995 FARM 
LEGISLATION 15 (May 1995), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/aer707 
/aer707a.pdf. See also 9 NEIL E. HARL, AGRICULTURAL LAW §§ 70.01–70.07 (1993 & 
Supp. 1994) (discussing the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act and Marketing Orders 
and Marketing Agreements). 
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of the AMAA213—which, generally, is to “establish . . . such orderly 
marketing conditions for agricultural commodities” as will benefit 
farmers and consumers.214 
4.  The Proposed National Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement 
In 2009, the NLGMA Proponent Group submitted a petition to the 
Department of Agriculture asking the Secretary to use his authority 
under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 to establish 
a national leafy greens marketing agreement (NLGMA) applicable to 
leafy greens handlers across the United States.215 Western Growers 
Association, a non-profit trade association that represents more than 
ninety percent of the leafy greens growers and handlers in California 
and Arizona, took a lead role in the NLGMA’s creation and 
promotion by helping to draft the Agreement’s language and 
testifying at many of the hearings on the proposal that were 
subsequently conducted by AMS throughout the United States.216 
Given Western Growers’ involvement, it’s not surprising that many 
structural features of the proposed NLGMA are similar to those 
included in the California and Arizona marketing agreements. The 
NLGMA comprises three different committees: administrative, 
technical review, and market review. The Administrative Committee, 
composed of producer and handler representatives from five different 
zones across the country, is responsible for the overall administration 
of the proposed NLGMA and, most important, has the power to 
“create operational rules and regulations, adopt metrics (after notice 
and comment), receive and investigate complaints, recommend 
amendments and collaborate with state entities.”217 The Technical 
Review Board, which includes food safety experts, USDA and FDA 
 
213 See, e.g., Queensboro Farm Prods., Inc. v. Wickard, 137 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1943) 
(Secretary of Agriculture is given broad discretion in administering AMAA). See also 
H.R. REP. NO. 73–6, at 490–91 (1933) (noting that the Secretary’s powers to enter into 
agreements under the AMAA are “sufficiently flexible to enable him to adapt . . . to 
changes in our economic situation at home and abroad” but that they are “restrained by the 
requirement that such agreements may be entered into only for the purpose of effectuating 
the declared policy of gradually establishing and maintaining such balance between 
production and consumption as will reestablish for agricultural commodities their pre-war 
purchasing power”). 
214 See 7 U.S.C. § 602(1), (4). 
215 NLGMA Proponent’s Group Brief, supra note 170, at 2. 
216 Giclas Testimony, supra note 189, at 1. 
217 DRAFT National Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement, Executive Summary of Key 
Provisions at 5, http://www.nlgma.org/documents/041009NLGMASummaryDraft.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2011). 
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officials, and industry representatives, is responsible for “developing 
and recommending the ‘metrics’ for a national program” while also 
accounting for regional growing variances and differences in the size 
and scale of farming operations.218 Finally, the Market Review Board 
includes representatives from food service companies, retail grocers, 
consumers, and academics, and will be called upon to provide advice 
on “retail, food service, and consumer issues that should be addressed 
to maximize [consumer confidence through] market acceptance and 
recognition of the program.”219 
Perhaps the most notable part of the NLGMA is who may become 
a signatory and who may not.220 Per the statutory language of the 
AMAA, only “handlers” of agricultural commodities are eligible to 
become signatories to the NLGMA.221 Notably, however, retailers and 
leafy greens brokers may not become signatories, and neither may the 
farmers who grow the leafy greens at issue: 
Producer is synonymous with grower and means any person 
engaged in a proprietary capacity in the production of leafy green 
vegetables for sale or delivery to a signatory of the agreement. 
Producers are NOT eligible to become signatories but because the 
agreement will impact growers who supply signatory handlers, they 
are given seats on the Marketing Committee to provide input and 
direction into the program.222 
 
218 Id. at 4. While these as-yet-unspecified metrics will likely use FDA’s GAP Guide as 
a starting point, the technical review board has the authority to start from a clean slate if it 
desires. See NLGMA Q&A, infra note 223 (“The [Technical Review Board] has license to 
begin with any set of industry metrics or other guidance in whole or part and may modify 
them to meet the needs of signatories or adopt them as is.”). 
219 DRAFT LEAFY GREENS MARKETING AGREEMENT DEFINITIONS, supra note 88, at § 
970.31. 
220 Signatories to the NLGMA agree to both announced and unannounced audits by 
USDA inspectors to ensure compliance with the GAP metrics promulgated by the 
technical review board, and they also agree to pay an assessment (not to exceed $.05 per 
carton of leafy greens handled) to fund the NLGMA. Id at § 970.66 (Verification Audits); 
§ 970.56 (Assessments). 
221 See 7 U.S.C. § 608b (“[T]he Secretary of Agriculture shall have the power . . . to 
enter into marketing agreements with processors, producers, associations of producers, and 
others engaged in the handling of any agricultural commodity or product thereof . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). However, the proposed NLGMA broadly defines “handlers” to include 
anyone who receives, acquires, ships, distributes, or imports leafy greens. DRAFT LEAFY 
GREENS MARKETING AGREEMENT DEFINITIONS, supra note 88, at §§ 970.11 and 970.12. 
222 Q&A Session for NLGMA Proponent Group Presentation at the National Leafy 
Greens Marketing Agreement Webinar (Aug. 19. 2009) [hereinafter NLGMA Q&A], 
available at http://www.nlgma.org/documents/090819QA.pdf (emphasis in original). 
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The distinction drawn between producers and handlers in the 
NLGMA is important because it raises questions about the 
permissible scope of marketing agreements, as discussed below. 
F.  The Failure of Public-Private Partnerships 
in Food Safety Regulation—Why the Proposed NLGMA 
Cannot Adequately Ensure the Safety of Leafy Greens 
1.  The Idea of Marketing Agreements as a Market Control Device is 
Not Consistent with Modern Food Industry Structure 
As a general matter, commentators have argued that marketing 
agreements—at least as they are needed to provide a semi-democratic 
means of collective organization—have been reduced to a historical 
anachronism by the rapid consolidation in the food industry during 
the past fifty years.223 As mentioned above, when Congress passed the 
AAA in the 1930s, large national and international agricultural 
commodity firms did not exist. Today, however, the economic and 
political landscape in which farmers operate is very different. Farmers 
today account for only about five percent of the rural population, and 
their voting power has diminished accordingly.224 Further, unlike 100 
years ago, agriculture is now big business. As noted in Part II.A, the 
leafy greens industry is highly concentrated, both in terms of 
unprocessed agricultural commodities—with most sourced from 
California and Arizona, and processed agricultural commodities—
with just four firms controlling eighty-six percent of the bagged salad 
market in 2006. The result is that issues historically addressed by 
marketing orders and agreements—that is, quality or quantity control 
requirements, pack or container requirements, or grade size and 
maturity standards—“are not likely very important or necessary 
because the large firms have their own, often superior, handling 
methods and product definitions.”225 So it is too with safety 
requirements. As we have seen, the very largest processors and 
retailers of leafy greens have already established strict super-metrics 
for bacterial contamination, and these metrics have influenced the 
market for leafy greens. 
However, just because the largest processors and retailers are able 
to corner the market for safety simply by way of market power does 
 
223 See Padberg & Hall, supra note 135, at 86–87 (arguing that marketing orders that 
regulate quality characteristics are “out of tune with the future”). 
224 Id. at 76. 
225 Id. at 82. 
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not mean that it is desirable for them to do so. As we will see, the 
second objection to marketing agreements—and the NLGMA in 
particular—is that they can be used merely as a vehicle in an intra-
industry fight to control safety standards in the absence of 
government regulation. 
2.  The NLGMA Is an Attempt to Create a Safety “Baseline” in the 
Absence of Government Regulation 
It is worth asking why Western Growers and other large leafy 
greens trade groups have pushed for a national agreement when, as 
mentioned above, the California and Arizona marketing agreements 
effectively cover ninety percent of the leafy greens sold at retail. One 
reason is surely that the Proponent Group sees ninety percent buy-in 
as incomplete, and the NLGMA is an attempt to corral the remaining 
ten percent of the leafy greens handlers, who are scattered throughout 
the Midwest and the East Coast. The Proponent Group has framed 
this as an accessibility problem: because their retail buyers expect 
them to adhere to the “strictest set of food safety rules” at all 
facilities, large handlers cannot source from growers in regions not 
subject to the California and Arizona marketing agreements.226 
Standardized safety metrics would therefore “facilitate commerce by 
allowing engaged handlers broader access to products than available 
today by allowing their suppliers to demonstrate they are following. . . 
accepted practices.”227 
But this collective buy-in seems to be only a precursor for the main 
reason driving a national leafy greens marketing agreement: the recent 
proliferation of private retailer super-metrics. As the Proponent Group 
puts it, “a standardized and agreed upon set of practices . . . can be 
utilized to push back on and help extinguish the diverse market driven 
specifications and independent audits that plague growers and handlers 
across the country.”228 There are two reasons why major leafy greens 
handlers might take issue with this so-called plague of independent 
and diverse safety efforts—one fairly cynical and the other less so. The 
less cynical reason is the need to standardize costs and “establish 
 
226 Leafy Green Vegetables in the United States: Hearing on Proposed Marketing 
Agreement No. 970 Before the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 11 (Sept. 24, 2009) (testimony of 
Drew McDonald, Vice President of National Quality Systems, Taylor Farms), available at 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5079859. 
227 Giclas Testimony, supra note 189, at 2. 
228 Id. 
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consistency in leafy green production and handling practices through 
the industry supply chain.”229 That seems fair, considering that retail 
super-metrics may duplicate, conflict with, or go beyond the self-
imposed standards of leafy greens handlers, thereby increasing 
compliance costs without necessarily increasing end-product safety. 
To the extent that a single set of leafy greens safety metrics reduces the 
fixed safety costs associated with processing leafy greens, both the 
industry and consumers stand to benefit. 
But the more cynical reason for handler pushback against retail 
super-metrics is competitive in nature—or more precisely, 
anticompetitive. In particular, leafy greens handlers worry that 
standards developed by retail distributors “are focused on protecting 
the retailer’s brand and not necessarily on protecting the grower and 
handler brands.”230 Furthermore, increasingly exacting and expensive-
to-comply-with retailer safety standards could lead to increasingly 
individualized supply chains for each retailer, thereby shrinking the 
overall number of handlers who can supply the largest produce buyers 
and reducing market competition.231 
The language about brand protection, however, is what really helps 
to explain why handlers are using collective efforts such as marketing 
agreements to fight retailers over safety standards. Recall the idea that 
food safety is much more about consumer perceptions than it is about 
the actual safety of a food. One commentator has compared the recent 
proliferation of private safety standards to “an ‘arms race’ to prove 
who is providing the safest food and hopefully capitalize on a 
perception of related consumer preferences.”232 Because consumers 
cannot tell if food is actually safe, they have to use proxies, and one 
fairly reliable proxy for food safety is a brand name. But as noted 
above, because many growers and handlers trade in raw agricultural 
commodities and do not sell directly to consumers, they simply 
cannot establish a retail brand. They can only hope to raise the safety 
 
229 NATIONAL LEAFY GREENS MARKETING AGREEMENT, supra note 133, § 3. 
230 Id. § 6. 
231 See id. (“[T]he retailer programs probably will not take into account the cost to a 
small producer or handler to implement the programs. In fact, with each large retailer 
developing its own standards, small handlers or growers will potentially be unable to 
compete for business delivering leafy green products to one of these retailers.”). 
232 STARMER & KULICK, supra note 146, at 6 (quoting MECHEL PAGGI, AN 
ASSESSMENT OF FOOD SAFETY POLICIES AND PROGRAMS FOR FRUITS AND VEGETABLES: 
FOOD-BORNE ILLNESS PREVENTION AND SECURITY 2 (2008)) (paper presented at the 
meeting of the North American Agrifood Market Integration Consortia Annual Workshop 
in Austin, Texas) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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stature of leafy greens as a whole, and doing so requires collective 
action from the entire leafy greens industry. 
This “arms race” might not be a problem if all industry players were 
competing to create the strictest standards for the safety of leafy 
greens, or a race to the top, but two points suggest that might not be 
the case. First, recall that food safety is primarily based on perceptions 
because of the informational asymmetry that exists between food 
companies and consumers: food companies know what food safety 
standards they employ, but the public often has no way to obtain this 
information. As a result, food companies have little incentive—other 
than perhaps the often-distant threat of tort litigation—to raise safety 
standards above industry minimums.  Second, there is currently no 
mandatory baseline for safety in the leafy greens industry. As noted 
above, the FDA has imposed only nonbinding guidance for ensuring 
the safety of leafy greens. From an industry perspective, a mandatory 
safety baseline can often be advantageous because it allows an 
individual firm to say confidently to the public that, if nothing else, its 
product is “safe,” at least as that term is contemplated by regulators. 
Firms may go beyond that standard if they want to say that their 
product is “safer.” For example, automakers put airbags and anti-lock 
brakes in their products, as mandated by regulation, but voluntarily fit 
their cars with electric nannies such as blind spot assistance cameras233 
and even pre-crash systems that tighten seatbelts and automatically 
apply the brakes when the car senses an imminent collision234 to 
distinguish their products on the basis of safety. And as Volvo can 
attest, consistently exceeding the mandatory safety baseline and 
leveraging that effort via brand distinction can help sell products. But 
in the leafy greens industry, the lack of brand differentiation among 
those who handle leafy greens, plus the lack of a safety baseline, raises 
the worrisome specter of an anticompetitive race to the bottom—a 
fight for control over an industry baseline of safety, in the absence of 
government regulation, rather than a fight to establish the most 
stringent safety standards. 
 
233 Christopher Diken, Volvo Invents BLIS: Blind Spot Info System, Actual Happiness 
Still Not Attainable, AUTOBLOG (Aug. 4, 2004, 9:13 AM), http://www.autoblog.com/2004 
/08/04/volvo-invents-blis-blind-spot-info-system-actual-happiness/. 
234 Brian Gill, What’s the Difference Between Pre-Collision and Advanced Pre-
Collision? Are They the Same System?, LEXUS DRIVERS, http://drivers.lexus.com 
/lexusdrivers/magazine/content.do#:/pub-share/magazine/html/Vehicle-Insider/Ask-Lexus 
-Collision.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2011). 
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There is evidence to suggest this is precisely the unstated goal 
behind the NLGMA. As the proponent group has put it: 
The market will always have the opportunity to go beyond any 
statutory or industry implemented program . . . . The proponents 
however do not believe that the marketplace should allow for 
differentiation based on product safety. . . . A single standard builds 
efficiencies and reduces costs throughout the chain so there is a 
strong return on investment inherent in collaborating to achieve a 
national standard.235 
As noted above, super-metrics are so named because they go above 
and beyond many of the growing field requirements already in place 
under the California and Arizona leafy greens agreements. So why 
adhere to an agreement that seeks to uniformly impose the lower 
standards of the previously enacted marketing agreements on a 
national scale? One commentator has framed the issue this way: 
[B]y setting the safety standards lower, and ceding the more 
stringent requirements to the then market-leader, Fresh Express, the 
[NLGMA would have] the effect of leveling the playing field for 
the rest of the market, and so ensuring that all would bear similar 
costs in meeting improved, but still lower, safety requirements. 
While a good public-relations maneuver, this was, in fact, a strongly 
anticompetitive move that created a set of largely voluntary safety 
requirements that were less stringent than what would have likely 
resulted if market participants had been forced to compete in an 
open market on the basis of improved safety and innovation. This 
can easily be seen if one looks at the requirements that were in the 
process of being imposed by major buyers of fresh produce, using 
their own economic leverage as a means of requiring a safer 
product.236 
This point is only bolstered by the position taken on the NLGMA by 
Chiquita Brands International, the parent company of Fresh Express, 
the largest brand name in the leafy greens business. Its post-hearing 
brief, which opposes the proposed NLGMA for many of the reasons 
discussed infra, is laden with language suggesting an anticompetitive, 
“safety baseline” rationale for the NLGMA. In objecting to the fact 
that the NLGMA is not harmonized with global food safety standards, 
Chiquita writes, “[f]or such companies already certified to a [Global 
Food Safety Initiative] recognized standard, the Proposed NLGMA 
audits of fields and manufacturing will be redundant and will not 
 
235 NLGMA Q&A, supra note 223 (emphasis added). 
236 Stearns, supra note 132, at 264–65. 
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provide any additional level of food safety assurance.”237 And perhaps 
even more telling is its objection to the assessment costs to be leveled 
on growers: “As a Company that consistently exceeds the standards 
contained in the Proposed NLGMA, the proposed assessments . . . 
seems excessive.”238 
Collusion among industry participants is not necessarily always a 
bad thing—after all, that is what the AMAA authorized producers to 
do. But collusion to achieve price control, which is what the AMAA 
contemplates, is a world away from collusion to achieve safety. 
Collusion to achieve safety is clearly outside the contemplated scope 
of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. 
3.  Reversing the AMAA: NLGMA’s Attempt to Regulate Producers 
for the Benefit of Handlers 
Economics aside, the question from a legal perspective is whether 
the NLGMA effectuates the declared policy of the AMAA, for in the 
end, that is the inquiry that the Secretary of Agriculture must make. 
As this Article discusses next, while the NLGMA may fit within the 
technical, narrow language of the marketing agreement provision, the 
statutory scheme taken as a whole, as well as prior marketing orders 
approved by the Secretary that regulate food safety, suggest that the 
NLGMA is in fact beyond the intended scope of the AMAA and 
would therefore be ultra vires if approved by the Secretary. 
a.  The AMAA Is Intended to Regulate Handlers for the Benefit of 
Producers 
The statutory language of the AMAA and the legislative history 
surrounding it do not directly answer two questions: Who does the 
AMAA regulate? And who is to benefit from that regulation? At least 
in the context of the marketing agreement provision 7 U.S.C. § 608b, 
the answer is not immediately clear—in no small part because 
marketing agreements have been, in the words of one commentator, a 
“[s]tatutory [d]ead [e]nd.”239 Though the Secretary has approved 
 
237 Brief on Behalf of Chiquita Brands International, Inc., and Its Wholly-Owned 
Subsidiary Fresh Express Incorporated: Leafy Green Vegetables in the United States: 
Hearing on Proposed Marketing Agreement No. 970 Before the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 5 No. 
AO-FV-09-0138 (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile 
?dDocName=STELPRDC5082265. 
238 Id. at 7. 
239 Bensing, supra note 203, at 9. 
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hundreds of marketing orders since the AAA’s passage in 1933, “with 
the exception of a single marketing agreement program for peanuts, 
handlers have never been willing to voluntarily enter into marketing 
agreements. . . .”240 Instead, most marketing agreements are the result 
of a marketing order: “Where a marketing order is in effect, however, 
the USDA will request handlers to sign marketing agreements which 
simply restate their obligations under the order.”241 Therefore, the 
reported cases that have interpreted the AMAA’s provisions have 
done so in the context of marketing orders. 
Despite the indeterminate holdings in the various cases, the answer 
to the question of who is to benefit from marketing orders and 
agreements seems reasonably clear: mainly farmers, as well as 
consumers. The best evidence for this statement is the AMAA’s 
declaration of policy, which gives the Secretary the power to establish 
orderly marketing conditions “as will provide, in the interests of 
producers and consumers,” an orderly supply of agricultural 
commodities.242 Courts looking to the AMAA’s legislative history 
and context have reached similar conclusions.243 
As to whom the AMAA is to regulate the answer is not quite as 
clear, though the answer is very likely to be handlers only. The 
statutory language of § 608b governs marketing agreements and 
provides the Secretary the authority to enter into agreements with 
“processors, producers, associations of producers, and others engaged 
in the handling of any agricultural commodity or product thereof.”244 
The provision on marketing orders, § 608c, permits the Secretary to 
issue orders applicable to “processors, associations of producers, and 
others engaged in the handling of any agricultural commodity or 
product thereof” but notably omits the word “producer” as is included 
 
240 Id. at 9 (citations omitted). 
241 Id. 
242 7 U.S.C. § 602(4) (emphasis added). 
243 See, e.g., Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 461 (1997) 
(purpose of AMAA is “[to] establish and maintain orderly marketing conditions and fair 
prices for agricultural commodities”); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 199 
(1939) (purpose of AMAA is to maintain orderly marketing conditions to insure farmers of 
purchasing power); Waddington Milk Co. v. Wickard, 140 F.2d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1944) 
(“here was . . . a regulative measure to improve marketing conditions not for the consumer, 
but for the producers . . . it was the impairment of ‘the purchasing power of farmers’ and 
the destruction of the value of ‘agricultural which support the national credit structure’ 
towards which the legislative attention was directed.”). 
244 7 U.S.C. § 608b(a) (emphasis added). 
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in § 608b.245 Complicating matters somewhat is § 608c(13)(A) and 
(B), which explicitly exempt from marketing orders, respectively, 
“any person who sells agricultural commodities or products thereof at 
retail in his capacity as such retailer” and “any producer in his 
capacity as a producer.”246 This statutory scheme has led one court to 
say flatly: “Although it protects producers, the AMAA regulates 
handlers only.”247 
Keep in mind, courts that have reached this conclusion spoke in the 
context of marketing orders. Notably, the language in § 608c(13)(B) 
does not have anything to say about whether this provision applies to 
marketing agreements, though because the statute very clearly 
delineates the two terms throughout, it is fair to assume that Congress 
could have said “no order or agreement” if it had wanted to be more 
restrictive.248 Indeed, courts have subsequently narrowed the language 
of § 608c(13)(B) by holding that producers who also handle 
agricultural commodities do not fit within the § 608c(13)(B) 
exception.249 
So does the marketing agreement provision also intend to exempt 
producers in their capacity as producers from regulation? We are left 
with the language of § 608b and its rather unfortunate comma 
 
245 7 U.S.C. § 608c(1). 
246 Id. at § 608c(13)(A)–(B). 
247 Lamers Dairy, Inc., v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 379 F.3d 466, 469 (7th Cir. 2004). See 
also Koretoff v. Vilsack, 601 F. Supp. 2d 238, 240 (D.D.C. 2009), overruled on other 
grounds, 614 F.3d 532 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Marketing orders regulate the activities of 
processors, associations of producers, and others engaged in the handling of certain 
agricultural commodities . . . . They do not regulate farmers in their capacity as producers 
(or growers).”). 
248 Compare 7 U.S.C. § 608c(13)(B) (“No order issued under this chapter shall be 
applicable to any producer in his capacity as a producer.”), with 7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(G) 
(“No marketing agreement or order applicable to milk and its products . . . shall prohibit 
or in any manner limit, in the case of the products of milk, the marketing in that area of 
any milk or product thereof produced in any production area in the United States.” 
(emphasis added)). 
249 See, e.g., Lion Raisins v. United States, 416 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(“Although producers are not directly bound by the statute . . . all persons seeking to 
market California raisins out-of-state are deemed handlers and must comply with the 
Order.”); United States v. United Dairy Farms Co-op. Ass’n, 611 F.2d 488, 491 n.7 (3d 
Cir.1979) (“producers who also function as handlers . . . are subject to regulation under 
[the milk marketing order].”); Ideal Farms, Inc. v. Benson, 288 F.2d 608, 614 (3d 
Cir.1961), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963) (“Other provisions of this section of the Act 
explicitly recognize that a person or business entity may be engaged in the milk business 
in more than one capacity and that a producer is exempt from regulation only in his 
capacity as a producer.”); Freeman v. Vance, 319 F.2d 841, 842 (5th Cir.1963) (same). 
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placement between “producers” and “and others engaged in the 
handling of any agricultural commodity . . . .” Does the language 
“engaged in the handling of any agricultural commodity” modify the 
entire preceding list, or does it refer to only the “and others” 
immediately preceding? Using the statutory interpretation canon 
reddendo singula singulis,250 the answer is likely the former. Reading 
on, we see that the word “handling” is used again in § 608b(a)—this 
time in the context of a clause that is essentially a statutory hook that 
brings the provision within Congress’ power to regulate interstate 
commerce.251 If this interstate commerce clause only modified the 
phrase “others engaged in the handling of any agricultural commodity 
or product thereof,” then it would follow that the Secretary could enter 
into agreements with “processors, producers, [and] associations of 
producers” that did not operate in interstate commerce.252 Giving § 
608b(a) this strained interpretation severely insults Congress’ collective 
ability to understand the basic constitutional limits of its authority. 
Therefore, it is likely that Congress intended marketing agreements, 
like marketing orders, to regulate only processors, producers, and 
associations of producers that handle the product at issue. 
In any case, the idea that marketing agreements regulate handlers 
for the benefit of growers is bolstered by Congress’ statutory scheme 
for the approval of marketing orders with and without marketing 
agreements. For example, 7 U.S.C. § 608c(8), “orders with marketing 
agreement,” conditions the issuance of marketing orders upon two 
things: first, at least fifty percent of the handlers of the regulated 
commodity must enter into a marketing agreement per § 608b, and 
second, the Secretary must then determine that at least two-thirds of 
the producers, either by number or by volume of product within the 
production area, approve of the order.253 
Furthermore, Congress provided a way for producers to regulate 
handlers even over their objection. Section 608c(9), “[o]rders with or 
without marketing agreement,” allows the Secretary to issue a 
 
250 “The different portions of a sentence . . . are to be referred respectively to the other 
portions or sentences to which we can see they respectively relate, even if strict 
grammatical construction should demand otherwise.” HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, 
HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 226 (2nd ed. 
1911). 
251 7 U.S.C. § 608b (“[O]nly with respect to such handling as is in the current of 
interstate or foreign commerce or which directly burdens, obstructs, or affects interstate or 
foreign commerce in such commodity or product thereof.”). 
252 See id. 
253 See 7 U.S.C. § 608c. 
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marketing order, “notwithstanding the refusal or failure of handlers. . .  
of more than [fifty percent] of the volume of the commodity or 
product thereof” to sign a marketing agreement, if the Secretary finds 
that (1) the order is favored by two-thirds of the producers of the 
regulated commodity, and (2) that issuance of the order is the “only 
practical means of advancing the interests of the producers of such 
commodity . . .”254 To sum up the marketing order statutory scheme: 
handlers cannot enact marketing orders without a two-thirds approval 
of producers, but producers can impose mandatory marketing orders 
on a minority of handlers, given a two-thirds majority of producer 
approval and a finding by the Secretary that the order will further the 
producers’—not the handlers’—interests. If there were ever a 
statutory scheme designed to regulate handlers for the benefit of 
producers, this would be it. 
Finally, the idea that marketing orders and agreements regulate 
handlers for the benefit of growers is also supported by the structure 
of mandatory marketing orders that have included food safety 
controls. For example, the almonds marketing order clearly 
distinguishes between almond growers and handlers, emphasizing that 
growers who do nothing more than sell or deliver almonds to handlers 
are not handlers themselves.255 Handlers have requirements for 
almonds that come into their processing plants (they must conduct 
random quality control sampling and dispose of inedible kernels)256 
and they have requirements for outgoing almonds (they must use 
either on-site or audit-based verification processes to ensure that 
 
254 See id. 
255 See 7 C.F.R. § 981.12 (2010) (“Grower is synonymous with producer and means 
any person engaging, in a proprietary capacity, in the commercial production of 
almonds.”); id. § 981.13 (“Handler means any person handling almonds during any crop 
year, except that such term shall not include either a grower who sells only almonds of his 
own production at retail at a roadside stand operated by him, or a person receiving 
almonds from growers and other persons and delivering these almonds to a handler.”); Id. 
§ 981.16 (“To handle means to use almonds commercially of own production or to sell, 
consign, transport, ship . . . or in any other way to put almonds grown in the area of 
production into any channel of trade for human consumption worldwide . . . . However, 
sales or deliveries by a grower to handlers, hullers or other processors within the area of 
production shall not, in itself, be considered as handling by a grower.” (emphasis added)). 
See also 72 Fed. Reg. 15,022 (Mar. 30, 2007) (“The rule only affects those who meet the 
definition of ‘handler’ in § 981.13 of the order . . .”). 
256 7 C.F.R. § 981.442(a). 
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almonds have been treated for harmful Salmonella bacteria),257 but the 
marketing order imposes no on-field metrics aimed specifically at 
growers. This is true even though one of the two Salmonella 
outbreaks identified by Congress as the impetus for the order was 
traced back to an almond orchard, not the processing facility.258 
Nevertheless, the order makes handlers, not growers, bear the direct 
burden and cost of implementing technology in their processing 
plants. 259 
b.  Turning the Table: The NLGMA Regulates Producers for the 
Benefit of Handlers 
It is very important to answer the question of who the AMAA 
regulates, as well as for the benefit of whom, because certain aspects 
of the proposed NLGMA do not regulate handlers—they regulate 
growers, regardless of whether these growers actually handle leafy 
greens. The NLGMA document at least gives lip service to the fact 
that AMAA implicitly limits regulation to handlers of leafy greens, 
noting in the Act’s definition section that the term “handle determines 
who is able to become a signatory to the marketing agreement. The 
marketing agreement will directly regulate ‘handlers’ . . . and so how 
handle is defined becomes a foundational issue for the agreement.”260 
Though the NLGMA broadly defines the term handler to include 
anyone who receives, acquires, sells, processes, ships, distributes, or 
 
257 7 C.F.R. § 981.442(b) (“[H]andlers shall subject their almonds to a treatment 
process or processes prior to shipment to reduce potential Salmonella bacteria 
contamination in accordance with the provisions of this section.”); id. § 981.442(b)(4) 
(“[H]andlers shall utilize either an on-site verification program (traditional), or an audit-
based verification program to ensure that their almonds have been subjected to a treatment 
process to reduce Salmonella bacteria prior to shipment. Each handler may decide which 
verification program would be the most cost-effective for his or her operation.”). 
258 Almonds Grown in California; Outgoing Quality Control Requirements, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 15, 021, 15,022 (Mar. 30, 2007). 
259 The process must deliver “a lethal treatment for Salmonella in almonds to achieve a 
minimum 4-log reduction” of the bacteria. Id. at 15,025. The pistachio marketing order 
imposes a similar scheme for reducing alfatoxin levels in pistachios. See 7 C.F.R. § 
983.14(a)-(c) (2010) (defining “handler” as anyone who receives, hulls, dries, or “[f]urther 
prepar[es]” pistachios for marketing or packaging); id. § 983.14(d) (noting that 
transporting pistachios from the orchard to the processing facility is not considered 
“handling”); id. § 981.150(d) (imposing mandatory alfatoxin sampling and testing 
procedures on handlers). 
260 DRAFT National Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement, Executive Summary of Key 
Provisions at 1, http://www.nlgma.org/documents/041009NLGMASummaryDraft.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2011). 
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imports leafy greens,261 it also defines producer separately. “Producer 
is synonymous with grower and means any person engaged in a 
proprietary capacity in the production of leafy green vegetables for 
sale or delivery to a signatory of this agreement.”262 The emphasized 
language suggests that the NLGMA drafters clearly contemplated that 
producers and handlers could be separate entities—a statement 
bolstered by the fact that the proponents have made it explicitly clear 
that “[p]roducers are NOT eligible to become signatories to the 
agreement . . . .”263 However, the agreement does allow growers to sit 
in their capacity as growers on the Administrative Committee that 
governs the agreement;264 this was done “to reflect the fact that even 
though growers are not directly regulated by the proposed national 
marketing agreement which is for ‘handlers’ of leafy greens—they 
are impacted and need to have a voice in the process.”265 
In reality, producers are more than impacted by the NLGMA—
they are regulated in their capacity as growers, even though the 
AMAA contemplates that they should not be. This is because many of 
the proposed NLGMA metrics—and in particular, the good 
agricultural practice (GAP) metrics—regulate at the growing field 
level, which is the very heart of a producer’s job. Though precise 
GAP audit metrics have not yet been set, an NLGMA summary 
document clarifies their intended scope: 
[The USDA will conduct] GAP audits of all producers including 
producers outside the production area who provide leafy greens to 
signatory handlers. These audits will cover good agricultural 
practices related to the following areas: water quality, soil 
amendments, machine harvest, hand harvest (including direct 
contact with soil during harvest), transfer of human pathogens by 
field workers, field sanitation, equipment-facilitated cross 
contamination, flooding, water usage to prevent dehydration, and 
 
261 DRAFT LEAFY GREENS MARKETING AGREEMENT DEFINITIONS, supra note 88, at § 
970.10. 
262 Leafy Green Vegetables Handled in the United States, Hearing on Proposed 
Marketing Agreement No. 970, 74 Fed. Reg. 45,565, 45,568 § 970.20 (Sept. 3, 2009) 
(emphasis added). 
263 NLGMA Q&A, supra note 223 (emphasis added). 
264 Draft Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement, supra note 87, at § 970.40 (“A majority 
of the producer members of the Committee shall not otherwise be engaged in the handling 
of leafy green vegetables or the manufacturing of fresh-cut, packaged leafy green products 
. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
265 NLGMA Q&A, supra note 223 (emphasis added). 
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production location concerns, including climatic conditions and 
environment, and encroachment by animals and urban settings.266 
At the same time, the NLGMA does propose good handling practices 
(GHPs) and good manufacturing practices for handlers, processors, 
and manufacturers of leafy greens, including post-harvesting process 
controls such as cooling, reuse of field containers, and the condition 
and sanitation of transport vehicles; handling and manufacturing 
processes such as wash water, wash system capacity, employee 
handling hygiene, and finished product packaging; and distribution 
handling processes such as temperature measurement of product and 
the condition and sanitization of cooling facilities. However, the 
thrust of the NLGMA is regulation of microbial contamination at the 
field level. That much is evident from the Proponent Group’s post-
hearing brief to the Secretary of Agriculture in support of the 
NLGMA, which notes that “there are two potential mechanisms of 
foodborne pathogen transmission from domestic animals or wildlife 
to leafy greens and both of these routes are addressed by the 
NLGMA.”267 It is true that these two mechanisms—direct 
transmission of bacteria through runoff of fecal matter and indirect 
transmission through soil, sediment, and bioaerosols—are the main 
methods of bacterial contamination on the growing fields, but the 
NLGMA does not address the fact that the contamination risk can be 
exacerbated by the processing methods used by the fresh-cut industry, 
as discussed above. Aside from standard sanitary practices such as 
employee hygiene, wash water controls, and temperature regulation 
that most processors likely already have in place, the NLGMA as 
proposed contains no requirements for Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Point (HACCP)-style programs that identify and address 
especially high-risk areas in the processing plant, or even any 
references to the FDA’s guidance for the vegetable processing 
industry. Rather, the crux of the agreement focuses on growing fields, 
which are controlled by producers—not all of whom are also handlers 
of leafy greens. 
This comprehensive regulation of growing fields would not be so 
worrisome if the proposed NLGMA were actually voluntary, as the 
 
266 NATIONAL LEAFY GREENS MARKETING AGREEMENT, supra note 133, § 8 
(emphasis added). 
267 NLGMA Proponent Group Brief, supra note 170, at 4. 
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Proponent Group continually stresses.268 In reality, though, it is not. 
That is because, as noted above, the leafy greens industry is driven by 
a highly centralized, top-down food supply chain that is controlled by 
the largest retailers and processors of leafy green vegetables. Handlers 
of leafy green vegetables have every incentive to sign up for the 
NLGMA since the agreement gives them considerable say in the 
process of creating the governing metrics.269 And because the handler 
industry recognizes the need for collective action to preempt the 
proliferation of retail super-metrics, once major handlers sign on, the 
dominoes will likely start to fall accordingly. 
The result is that growers who want to continue to sell their leafy 
greens to handlers will have no choice but to comply with the 
handler-mandated NLGMA GAP metrics, particularly in areas such 
as California and Arizona, “where a few handlers dominate the 
market, and growers have little choice of buyers for their product.”270 
This fact is further illustrated by the ninety-nine percent participation 
rate in the CLGMA.271 This concern has been raised not only by 
growers—some of whom have already lost handler accounts due to 
 
268 See, e.g., Leafy Green Vegetables in the United States: Hearing on Proposed 
Marketing Agreement No. 970 Before the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 4 (Oct. 6, 2009) (testimony of 
Tom Stenzel, President & CEO, United Fresh Produce Ass’n), available at 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5080123 (“A NLGMA 
[is] 100% voluntary—no individual grower or handler has to participate. For those who fear 
that retailers will demand it, a [sic] NLGMA will no more raise nor reduce the likelihood that 
retailers will want compliance that you follow GAPs.”). 
269 For example, the proposed Administrative Committee, which is to establish the 
“terms and conditions” of the NLGMA, consists of 23 seats—13 for handlers, 6 for 
producers, and 4 for other non-handler members. DRAFT LEAFY GREENS MARKETING 
AGREEMENT, supra note 88, at § 970.40(a). 
270 Leafy Green Vegetables in the United States: Hearing on Proposed Marketing 
Agreement No. 970 Before the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., (Oct. 22, 2009) (testimony of Roland 
McReynolds), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName 
=STELPRDC5080471. See also Jane Palmer, New Food Safety Rules Threaten Small 
Organic Farms, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 23, 2010, http://www.mercurynews 
.com/breaking-news/ci_15148280?nclick_check=1 (quoting one California-based grower 
as saying that she follows the CLGMA because “if I don’t comply, then I won’t have 
anybody to sell to”). 
271 In fact, one of the Proponent Group’s witnesses admitted at the ALJ hearing that a 
marketing agreement and order would have the same effect. “[I]f we look at the results from 
the California Leafy Greens, what is it, 99 percent participation of that order [sic]? What’s 
the difference between 99 percent and having everyone participating between the agreement 
and the order? So it’s a very small difference in the effect.” Leafy Green Vegetables in the 
United States: Hearing on Proposed Marketing Agreement No. 970 Before the U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., Docket No. AO-FE-09-0138, 315 (Sept. 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5080510. 
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their decision not to follow California LGMA standards272—but also 
by some small handlers of locally and organically grown leafy greens, 
who fear that their grower-suppliers either would not or could not 
comply with NLGMA requirements due to cost and scale restraints.273 
Furthermore, the proposed NLGMA adds another form of market 
compulsion: an “official certification mark” that would be licensed 
for use by all handlers in compliance with the NLGMA’s 
provisions.274 Though the Proponent Group has clarified that this 
mark is to be placed only on bills of lading or packing boxes shipped 
to retailers and not on any packaging that consumers will see,275 the 
implicit notion behind the mark is clear: leafy greens sourced by 
unmarked handlers are less safe than those of NLGMA signatories. 
The use of this certification mark is perhaps the clearest indication 
that the NLGMA is intended by proponents as a collective attempt to 
corner the safety market in the leafy greens industry, thereby stealing 
the thunder of retailer efforts. It also belies the notion that the 
NLGMA is intended to be a voluntary agreement. 
1.  The NLGMA Makes Food Safety a Subset of Food Quality 
In the debate over the leafy greens marketing agreement, it is easy 
to lose sight of what this debate is ultimately about. As noted above, 
the Secretary may approve any marketing agreement if it, as 
applicable here, “provides, in the interests of producers and 
consumers, an orderly flow of the supply [of leafy greens] to market 
throughout its normal marketing season to avoid unreasonable 
 
272 See Palmer, supra note 271 (noting that one small organic farmer who declined to 
follow the CLGMA regulations “has lost his Canadian accounts as the nation’s 
government prohibits imports of leafy produce from farmers who have not signed on to the 
marketing agreement. The cost, 5 percent of his income, is not borne easily in today’s 
economy”). 
273 As one small handler recounted in his testimony before the USDA: “As one mid-
size farmer on the Central Coast of California said to me last Monday, ‘what am I going to 
do? Aside from my home ranch I have 11 other properties that I lease for production. That 
is a total of 12 separate water sources. How can I afford to test 12 separate water sources 
with any regularity?’” Leafy Green Vegetables in the United States: Hearing on Proposed 
Marketing Agreement No. 970 Before the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 3 (Sept. 24, 2009) 
(testimony of Bu Nygrens, Co-Owner & Purchasing Manager, Veritable Vegetables), 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5079869. 
274 DRAFT LEAFY GREENS MARKETING AGREEMENT, supra note 88, at § 970.69. 
275 See NLGMA Proponent Group Brief, supra note 170, at 15 (“[N]othing in the 
proposed rule contemplates that the certification mark would appear on consumer 
packaging.”). 
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fluctuations in supplies and prices.”276 This orderly marketing 
business is a pretty long way from what started this whole debate: the 
safety—or lack thereof—of leafy greens. And that raises the critical 
question of who is best positioned to address that issue. The question 
is important because both industry and federal agencies in this debate 
define the word safety in different ways—and not always in the same 
way that the public defines it. This idea will be discussed later in this 
section. 
But first, the who of marketing agreements. Once approved by the 
Secretary of Agriculture, marketing agreements are administered by 
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), a division of the USDA. It is 
important to repeat at the outset that the USDA’s role is merely 
supervisory: the industry writes its own metrics, the Secretary stamps 
his approval, and USDA inspectors or USDA-approved state 
authorities enforce the industry-created rules. If this does not exactly 
sound like a model setup for safety regulation, that is because it is not 
meant to be—and in fact, the USDA has explicitly acknowledged the 
FDA’s primacy in the area of fruit and vegetable food safety.277 
AMS’s role within USDA is even more specialized. The mission of 
AMS, as its director has told Congress, “is to facilitate the strategic 
marketing of agricultural products in the domestic and international 
marketplace. AMS is not a food safety agency. The agency, through 
programs such as marketing orders and agreements, assists handlers 
and producers in verifying various product quality control efforts.”278 
Reduced to two words, AMS’s purview is this: product quality. 
Given AMS’s—and ultimately USDA’s—limited jurisdiction over 
produce safety, the question is how the term safety should be defined. 
Is food safety one of many attributes, such as size, variety, and color 
wrapped up in the concept of food quality, or is food safety something 
altogether separate—an end to be achieved of itself? The proponents 
of the NLGMA clearly believe it is the former: 
The industry believes that a national marketing agreement 
promulgated by USDA is the best available instrument for 
protecting the quality and hence, the marketability of fresh leafy 
green vegetables by promoting the use of scientifically-based 
 
276 7 U.S.C. § 602(4) (2010). 
277 Pegg Testimony, supra note 75, at 2 (“As you know, the Food and Drug 
Administration is the Federal agency with primary responsibility for food safety of fruits 
and vegetables.”). 
278 Id. 
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GAPs, GHPs, and GMPs in a standardized manner to reduce 
physical, chemical, and microbial contamination events.279 
Hence: 
USDA is the most appropriate federal agency to oversee a national 
food quality enhancement program because it has significant 
expertise and experience in the design and delivery of programs that 
involve inspection for product quality and verification of production 
practices. . . . Both the leafy green industry and the USDA have a 
good working relationship with the FDA on food quality programs 
that include food safety issues.280 
And if there was any question as to whether the proponent group 
views AMS as the proper sub-agency to regulate the safety of leafy 
greens: “Proof of use of best practices is essential to the marketability 
of fresh produce. Growers that demonstrate the use of GAPs, GHPs, 
and GMPs will undoubtedly have better marketing opportunities than 
those who cannot demonstrate that they have a food safety and quality 
management program in place.”281 Fair point, that last one: “We 
would know whether our lettuce was tainted if only we had a quality 
management program!” does not exactly make for a catchy 
advertising tagline. 
In any event, AMS appears to agree with the NLGMA 
proponents—safety is an element of quality, and therefore making 
food safer makes it a higher quality product, which makes it easier to 
sell to consumers, which—ostensibly—helps maintain an orderly 
flow of the commodity. Quite the chain of reasoning. AMS considers 
“the absence of harmful pathogens or toxins to be a characteristic of 
higher quality products,” Administrator Pegg told Congress in 
2007.282 In its inspection standards regulations for fruits, vegetables, 
and specialty crops, USDA defines quality as “the combination of the 
inherent properties or attributes of a product which determines its 
relative degree of excellence.”283 The italicized language in the two 
quotes above suggests that the USDA views food safety not only as a 
subset of food quality, but as something that is subject to degrees. 
 
279 Leafy Green Vegetables in the United States: Hearing on Proposed Marketing 
Agreement No. 970 Before the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2 (Sept. 22, 2009) [hereinafter Pezzini 
Testimony] (testimony of Joe Pezzini, Chief Operating Officer, Ocean Mist Farms), 
available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC 5079700. 
280 Id. (emphasis added). 
281 Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
282 Pegg Testimony, supra note 75, at 5 (emphasis added). 
283 7 C.F.R. § 51.2(p) (2010) (emphasis added). 
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But safe and safety as adjectives are not relative terms, nor should 
they be defined that way. The dictionary supports this (“Safety: the 
quality or condition of being safe; freedom from danger, injury or 
damage; security”),284 and so does common usage (in baseball, a base 
runner is either safe or out). Certainly, some activities or positions can 
be perceived as safer than others. Eating leafy greens with a fork is 
safer than eating them with a butcher knife, and by the same token, 
the perception of food safety—that is, how food is marketed to 
consumers—can also be subject to degrees. That is because, as 
mentioned above, the informational asymmetry in the food industry 
leaves consumers guessing as to whether their leafy greens are 
contaminated with harmful pathogens. They can deal only in 
probabilities or risks. So leafy greens with an NLGMA stamp of 
approval might be perceived as safer (i.e., less likely to be 
contaminated by pathogens and therefore “Grade A” leafy greens) 
than those not run through NLGMA metrics (i.e., more likely to be 
contaminated and therefore “Grade B” greens). But as to the actual 
safety of the greens themselves, there is no Grade B. Food is either 
Grade A (not contaminated and therefore safe) or Grade F 
(contaminated and therefore unsafe). 
In the end, to equate food safety with food quality and therefore 
subject it to degrees is to seriously undermine the historical notion in 
the United States of food safety as a public good. Put another way: 
[Food safety] is a critical issue that rises above other characteristics 
like size, variety, or appearance. The issue of whether minimum 
safety practices were followed is not something that should be 
subject to efforts to distinguish between competing brands. It is 
unfair to ask consumers to determine which products were produced 
with which food safety standards—and it is unacceptable to make 
the penalty for buying the wrong brand an increased risk of 
illness.285 
The notion of food safety as a public good to be achieved as an end 
in itself is supported by the structure of our system of laws. As 
common law developed in England, it split into two branches: torts, 
which remedied violations by individuals against other individuals, 
 
284 WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1181 (3d ed. 1997). 
285 Leafy Green Vegetables in the United States: Hearing on Proposed Marketing 
Agreement No. 970 Before the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., (Sept. 23, 2009) (testimony of Patty 
Lovera, Assistant Director, Food & Water Watch), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov 
/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5079736. 
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and criminal law, which remedied an individual’s violations against 
the state or society as a whole.286 In the late nineteenth century, faced 
with the development of an industrialized food regime, U.S. 
lawmakers decided that “provision of foods that threaten the integrity 
of our food supply should be treated as a crime against society.”287 
This notion can be seen in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s 
strict liability criminal penalties for violating its misbranding 
provisions, which can include fines and even imprisonment. The 
FFDCA, of course, is administered not by the USDA, but by the FDA, 
which as mentioned above is a consumer protection agency dedicated 
to safety as opposed to maximizing production and rural economic 
development. 
In any case, the point of the foregoing discussion should be 
abundantly clear: food safety is far too important a goal to be reduced 
to the vagaries of “quality” and “orderly marketing.” And because of 
their collusive nature, marketing agreements have the potential to 
undermine the deliberative process contemplated by more formal 
types of rulemaking. A marketing agreement results in private 
standards promulgated by industry groups that are subject to change 
at any time,288 and that may or may not take into consideration the 
needs of minority groups such as small scale or organic growers and 
handlers within the industry289 or the public at large.290 
 
286 Lyon, supra note 42, at 745. 
287 Id. 
288 See NLGMA Q&A, supra note 223 (noting that “an industry program is much more 
flexible, adaptable and can be changed more easily than a government rule”). 
289 See, e.g., Community Alliance with Family Farmers, Policy: Leafy Green Marketing 
Agreement, available at http://www.caff.org/policy/leafygreen.shtml (last visited Apr. 24, 
2011) (listing several links to position papers opposing the marketing agreement’s potential 
impact on small farms). Examples of the disparate impact in proposed leafy green 
marketing agreements include testing requirements as these costs would comprise a large 
percent of the operations total budget, and setback requirements which would be spread 
over fewer acres of potential production. See Community Alliance with Family Farmers, 
Comments to Joint Assembly and Senate Committees on Agriculture, Feb. 27, 2007, at 5, 
available at http://www.caff.org/policy/CAFFCommentsonFoodSafety.pdf. Part of the 
justification for this opposition is the contention that the potential for more widespread 
damage from a foodborne illness and thus the necessity for expensive investment in 
technological solutions arise from production factors inherent only (or with greater 
frequency) in larger-scale operations. Accordingly, only large operations should bear the 
burden of mandatory investment in technological solutions. See Cohen, supra note 36, at 
38–39. The FDA Food Safety Modernization Act incorporates this concept, exempting 
from some rules small business with limited sales. See H.R. 2751, 111th Cong., § 103 
(2011) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 418(k)). 
290 Consumers Union, the nonprofit publisher of Consumer Reports magazine, opposes 
the NLGMA on grounds that it would “allow the leafy green industry to develop its own  
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Perhaps worst of all, the NLGMA might create the perception that 
leafy greens are safe without actually making them so, if the metrics 
are not strong enough or policed with sufficient rigor.291 In any case, 
the NLGMA certainly will not be enforced with the power of recall 
now granted to the FDA. Instead, the ultimate penalty for failing to 
comply with the NLGMA metrics is not a fine, or removal of the 
greens from the market, but the loss of the privilege of using the 
NLGMA mark of certification, which does not even appear on 
consumer packaging to start with.292 Suffice to say that this likely is 
not the leafy greens regulation that the public would want if they had 
a say in the process, and they ought to be given a chance to voice their 
concerns on the front end through a deliberative, open forum such as 
the kind provided by notice-and-comment regulation. This point 
garners additional force when one considers that the Supreme Court 
has ruled that consumers do not have standing to challenge the 
Secretary’s promulgation of marketing orders and agreements.293 
2.  Agency Capture and Skirting Responsibility—Why Government 
Regulation Is a Better Solution 
From an industry perspective, the weak-kneed regulation and 
enforcement scheme provided by the USDA and AMS under the 
proposed NLGMA is likely precisely the goal. And that raises the 
third strike against marketing agreements: agency capture. As one 
commentator has noted in the context of food safety regulation, “[i]n 
the subtlest sense, capture exists any time an agency moves too far 
toward accommodating a single interest while moving away from its 
statutory mission. Such capture may provide a measure of public 
 
safety standards virtually all by itself, with only a minor tip of the hat to public input.” 
Leafy Green Vegetables in the United States: Hearing on Proposed Marketing Agreement 
No. 970 Before the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Sept. 23, 2009 (testimony of Elisa Odabashian at 
1), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName 
=STELPRDC5079744. 
291 In July 2009, a CLGMA signatory recalled 22,000 cases of lettuce shipped to 29 
states after a random sample by the Wisconsin Department of Agriculture tested positive 
for salmonella. See Rusk, supra note 113. 
292 See notes 275–276 supra and accompanying text. 
293 Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 352 (1984) (“The Act 
contemplates a cooperative venture among the Secretary, producers, and handlers; 
consumer participation is not provided for or desired under the complex scheme enacted 
by Congress. Consumer suits would undermine the congressional preference for 
administrative remedies and provide a mechanism for disrupting administration of the 
congressional scheme.”). 
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good, but regulators’ care is balanced more for industry benefit than 
for the public’s.”294 According to AMS, that is exactly what 
marketing orders and agreements do—they “balance the availability 
of quality product with the need for adequate returns to producers and 
the demands of consumers.”295 It is notable that AMS’s most robust 
audit programs—the Qualified Through Verification and the GAP and 
GHP Audit Verification Program—were created at industry 
request.296 And “[as] the demand for verification of GAP, GHP, and 
GMP has increased, commodity groups have approached USDA for 
assistance with the development of commodity specific audit 
programs.”297 That is because the industry believes that USDA will be 
more responsive than FDA in responding to their needs. This is not to 
say that the NLGMA proponents naively believe that the NLGMA 
can preempt FDA regulation altogether.298 Rather, a USDA-approved 
NLGMA allows the major players in the leafy greens industry to 
continue to do what they have always tried to do: retain control of the 
rules to which they are bound.299 As the Proponent Group has put it: 
If there is a clear signal from USDA early, through the approval of a 
[sic] NLGMA, proponents anticipate that US FDA will be a 
collaborator in the development of audit metrics for the program. 
This would allow the FDA to recognize this industry program as 
meeting their requirements and expectations.300 
And perhaps that is the bottom line—an NLGMA designed to 
improve safety with costs imposed on the grower community and 
controlled exclusively by industry, under the supervision of a friendly 
USDA regime, rather than mandatory FDA regulations that take 
control over safety metrics outside of industry hands. As discussed 
 
294 Fortin, supra note 32, at 582. 
295 Agric. Mktg. Serv., Marketing Orders and Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateA&nav
ID=MarketingOrders&leftNav=MarketingOrders&page=MarketingOrders&acct=AMSPW 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2011). 
296 Souza Testimony, supra note 158, at 2. 
297 Id. at 3. 
298 See Stenzel Testimony, supra note 269, at 2 (“I think it’s wise for all of us to realize 
that mandatory GAPs for all leafy greens are not far away . . . . A NLGMA will not 
forestall nor replace these eventual FDA regulations . . . . However, it can be helpful now 
in gaining grower/handler input and consensus on what the rules ought to be, and 
subsequently in demonstrating compliance with those rules.”). 
299 See Bensing, supra note 203, at 42 (questioning continued appropriateness of 
“giving industry leaders the authority to administer a program that regulates their 
competitors and themselves”). 
300 NLGMA Q&A, supra note 223. 
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below, the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act passed by Congress 
in December 2010 cuts through this administrative maneuvering and 
specifically authorizes FDA, rather than USDA, to issue regulations 
relating to leafy green safety at both the field level301 and further 
along the food supply chain.302 This may foreclose any chance of a 
NLGMA. However, leafy greens are not the only commodity 
potentially subject to a marketing agreement or order and the 
arguments surrounding this questionable approach to food safety 
regulation may resurface in another context. As discussed in the next 
section, shell egg safety presents another example of multiagency 
jurisdiction and a compelling case for food safety reform. 
III 
SHELL EGGS: CONSOLIDATION, INDUSTRIALIZATION, 
AND REGULATORY RECALCITRANCE 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has 
recognized Salmonella Enteritidis (SE) contamination in eggs and the 
associated public health implications since 1988.303 Eggs may become 
contaminated during egg formation in the ovary or via subsequent 
contact with contaminated materials that penetrate the egg shell.304 
There are numerous programs, administered by several agencies, 
directed at preventing SE infections.305 Recent government estimates 
from the FDA and USDA estimate that of the forty-seven billion eggs 
consumed as shell eggs, 2.3 million are SE-positive,306 resulting in 
more than one million illnesses and several hundred deaths per year.307 
 
301 See H.R. 2751, 111th Cong. § 104 (2011) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 118). 
302 See H.R. 2751 § 102 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 117). 
303 GAO EGG SAFETY, supra note 40 at 1. See also FDA SE Final Rule, supra note 65, 
at 33,031. 
304 FDA SE Final Rule, supra note 65, at 33,032. 
305 Among the programs are the continuous inspection of egg processing facilities and 
mandatory pasteurization of processed egg products, administered by the USDA Food 
Safety Inspection Service (FSIS), 9 C.F.R. Part 590 (2010); the Agricultural Marketing 
Service’s (AMS) oversight and inspections to prevent cracked, dirty, and otherwise unfit 
eggs from being sold on the shell egg market, 7 C.F.R. Part 57; the Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service’s (APHIS) voluntary breeding program to reduce the incidence 
of SE in laying hens, 9 C.F.R. Part 145 and 147; and the FDA’s mandatory food safety 
labeling warning, 21 C.F.R. § 101.17(h). For a more detailed discussion of the regulatory 
morass, see Eskin, supra note 80, at 441. 
306 FDA SE Final Rule, supra note 65, at 33,032. 
307 The government estimated 1,203,650 illnesses and 494 deaths in 2001, and 
1,376,514 illnesses and 427 deaths in 2004. Id. at 33,031. 
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A.  Shell Egg Production Background 
From 1999 through 2009, egg production in the United States 
increased from eighty-four to ninety-one billion eggs per year308—a 
rather modest increase relative to other agricultural products such as 
leafy greens,309 or commodities such as corn310 and soybeans.311 What 
is remarkable, however, is that the vast majority of the production 
increase occurred in one state—Iowa. This was not always the case. In 
1993, Iowa was the ninth largest egg producer.312 Egg production more 
than doubled in Iowa from 1999 through 2009, and increased fourfold 
between 1993 and 2009.313 By 2001, Iowa surpassed Ohio, formerly 
number one, and now almost doubles Ohio’s annual production.314 
Iowa’s rapid ascent to the top coincides with tremendous structural 
change in the nature of egg production. In 1987, there were 
approximately 2500 egg-producing farms.315 By 2009, 205 industrial-
scale operations produced ninety-five percent of the nation’s eggs.316 
And of these 205, sixty-two had operations with more than one 
million animals and twelve had more than five million.317 This 
massive structural change in the industry coincided with the 
movement of egg production from other states to Iowa. 
 
308 See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Nat’l Agric. Statistics Serv., Egg Production, 1996–2006 
(May 2007), http://www.nass.usda.gov/Charts_and_Maps/Poultry/eggprd.asp. 
309 See supra notes 84–105 and accompanying text (discussing growth in leafy green 
production). 
310 See Nat’l Corn Growers Ass’n, Corn Production Trends, 2009, available at 
http://www.ncga.com/corn-production-trends (stating that corn production increased from 
9,430,612 million bushels in 1999 to 13,130,632 bushels in 2009). 
311 See The American Soybean Association, Soy Stats®, U.S. Soybean Production 
1984–2009, 2010, available at http://soystats.com/2010/page_09.htm (stating that soybean 
production increased from 2654 million bushels in 1999 to 3361 million bushels in 2009). 
312 Iowa produced 3328 million eggs in 1993. See Nat’l Agric. Statistics Serv., 
Chickens and Eggs Annual Summary, available at http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/Mann 
Usda/viewDocumentInfo.do?documentID=1509. 
313 Iowa produced 6745 million eggs in 1999 and 14,475 million in 2009. Statistics 
compiled from annual statistical summaries, Nat’l Agric. Statistics Serv., Chickens and 
Eggs Annual Summary (1995–2011), available at http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu 
/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?documentID=1509. 
314 See id. In 2009, Ohio produced 7392 million eggs, compared to Iowa’s production 
of 14,475 million. NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV. CHICKEN AND EGGS 2009 SUMMARY 
3 (Feb. 2010) available at http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/nass/ChickEgg/2010s/2010 
/ChickEgg-02-25-2010.pdf. 
315 American Egg Board, Egg Industry Fact Sheet, available at http://www.aeb.org 
/egg-industry/industry-facts/egg-industry-facts-sheet. 
316 Id. The largest 205 operations all have more than 75,000 laying hens. Id. 
317 Id. 
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This raises the question: Why Iowa? What competitive advantage 
does Iowa have over others? Corn is one answer—Iowa is 
consistently one of the top corn-producing states. There is an 
abundant supply of the yellow gold—a primary component of chicken 
feed—in Iowa.318 But another contributing factor has a more cynical 
bent. Might this be an example of the proverbial race to the bottom to 
attract an industry with significant environmental externalities and a 
history of low-wage employees? And unlike California,319 Iowa has 
little chance of a robust animal welfare movement taking off that 
could potentially increase production costs. 
The summer 2010 shell egg recall is illustrative. The largest known 
SE outbreak in history320 was found in shell eggs traced back to two 
facilities—Wright County Egg, in Galt, Iowa, and Hillandale Farms 
of Iowa, Inc.321 From May 1 to November 30, at least 1939 people fell 
ill after consuming eggs sold under the brand names of Lucerne, 
Albertson, Mountain Dairy, Ralph’s, Boomsma’s, Sunshine, 
Hillandale, Trafficanda, Farm Fresh, Shoreland, Lund, Dutch Farms, 
and Kemps, among others.322 In mid-August, both Wright County Egg 
and Hillandale Farms voluntarily implemented a nationwide recall 
covering more than 500 million eggs.323 
Unfortunately, this was not an isolated event for Austin J. 
DeCoster, the owner of both facilities distributing the tainted eggs. In 
fact, The New York Times reported that egg operations owned by Mr. 
DeCoster were the primary source of some of the first major SE 
 
318 See U.S. Dep’t  of Agric., 2010 Corn for Grain Harvested, NASS.USDA.GOV, 
available at http://www.nass.usda.gov/Charts_and_Maps/graphics/cornacm.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2011) (indicating that Iowa was the largest corn producer in the United 
States for 2010). 
319 California Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE §§ 
25990 et seq. (2008) (commonly referred to as “Proposition 2,” prohibiting, starting 
January 1, 2015, the confinement of farm animals in a manner that does not allow them to 
turn around freely, lie down, stand up, and fully extend their limbs/wings). 
320 F.D.A., Frequently Asked Questions and Answers: FDA’s Investigations into the 
Salmonella Enteritidis Outbreak Involving the Recall of Shell Eggs, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/Food/NewsEvents 
/WhatsNewinFood/ucm223723.htm. 
321 Id. 
322 F.D.A., Salmonella Enteritidis Outbreak in Shell Eggs, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERV. (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/food/newsevents/whatsnewinfood 
/ucm222684.htm. 
323 Id. 
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outbreaks involving eggs in the 1980s.324 Due to repeated problems 
with SE contamination with DeCoster operations, the state of New 
York banned the sale of eggs from his farms.325 Maine and Maryland 
forced his farms to undertake a rigorous SE testing program as a 
condition of future sales.326 After state testing of DeCoster operations 
revealed widespread contamination,327 Maryland imposed a 
quarantine whereby DeCoster could only sell his eggs to processing 
plants that would pasteurize them.328 DeCoster violated the order, 
selling shell eggs to a local store and received a sentence of probation 
and a small fine.329 DeCoster sold his Maryland farms in 1993 to 
focus his efforts in Iowa—a state that had no SE testing 
requirements.330 And now, Iowa leads the nation in egg production. 
In the wake of the egg recall and the national attention focused on 
Iowa’s farm policies, the Editorial Board of The Des Moines Register 
rejected calls for a state Salmonella testing program similar to 
Maine’s, stating that “oversight of this country’s food supply is a 
federal responsibility . . . [that] needs uniform standards that apply to 
all states.”331 The problem with individual state standards, according 
to the editors, is that “eventually state lawmakers would loosen 
regulations to attract producers and jobs. Companies would gravitate 
to states with the least-stringent regulations—creating a sort of ‘race 
 
324 See William Neuman, An Iowa Egg Farmer and a History of Salmonella, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/22/business/22eggs.html. The 
first Salmonella outbreak identified by public health officials involved runny scrambled 
eggs served at a nursing home in New Hampshire. Id. The eggs were from a former 
DeCoster farm, which he later repurchased. Id. Five years later, in 1987, another outbreak 
in a hospital traced the eggs to another DeCoster-owned farm in Maryland, followed by 
two more outbreaks the next year traced to the same farm. Id. 
325 Id. 
326 Id. Pennsylvania also established a nationally recognized Salmonella prevention 
program. See Pennsylvania Dep’t of Agric., Pennsylvania Egg Quality Assurance Program, 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_2_24476_10297_0_43 
/http%3B/10.41.0.36/AgWebsite/ProgramDetail.aspx?name=Pennsylvania-Egg-Quality 
-Assurance-Program-%28PEQAP%29&navid=12&parentnavid=0&palid=56& (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2011). 
327 Neuman, supra note 325. 
328 Id. 
329 Id. (DeCoster complained about the cost of testing for Salmonella, insisting there was 
little risk associated with egg production/consumption.). The Maryland state veterinarian 
noted that DeCoster refused to acknowledge that he was causing a problem. Id. 
330 Id. 
331 The Register’s Editorial, Cracking Down on Eggs is a Federal Job, DES MOINES 
REGISTER (Sept. 18, 2010), http://www.truthabouttrade.org/news/latest-news/16666           
-cracking-down-on-eggs-is-federal-job-. 
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to the bottom’ in food safety standards.”332 Apparently, the editors 
failed to the look in mirror—Iowa ran that race and the prize was the 
DeCoster facilities, similar industrial-scale operations, and the honor 
of receiving the Centers for Disease Control’s attention during the 
summer of 2010. 
B.  Testing Regimes and Jurisdictional Limits 
As one digs deeper into the 2010 Salmonella outbreak, the 
importance of a rigorous testing regime becomes clear. But testing is 
only part of the solution; what to do with the test results and which 
agency has jurisdiction to order remedial actions remain key issues 
that, unfortunately, contributed to the latest SE contamination at a 
DeCoster facility. 
The FFDCA generally does not require pre-approval of food 
products, and thus the FDA does not inspect food production 
facilities—including shell egg operations—on a regular schedule 
absent a reported problem.333 Accordingly, prior to its 2010 
implementation of the new SE testing program334 the FDA almost 
never inspected shell egg production facilities.335 On the other hand, 
USDA’s FSIS, under the Egg Products Inspection Act, must conduct 
daily, continuous inspections of egg product facilities.336 Moreover, 
USDA AMS inspectors are present in those facilities that elect to 
participate in the agency’s grading program for shell eggs. 
The Wright County Egg facility tested positive for Salmonella 426 
times from 2008 to 2010—seventy-three of the samples were for 
Salmonella Enteritidis, the strain that caused the illnesses.337 As part 
 
332 Id. 
333 GAO EGG SAFETY, supra note 40, at 15. 
334 See FDA SE Final Rule, supra note 65. After implementation of the new rule, FDA 
officials are inspecting the nation’s six hundred largest egg production facilities. Layton, 
supra note 41; see also, FDA, FDA Begins Inspections under the Egg Safety Rule (Sept. 
28, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/Product-
SpecificInformation/EggSafety/ucm 227619.htm (intending to complete inspections within 
15 months). 
335 Layton, supra note 41. 
336 Id. This is a classic example of the failure of risk-based prevention. Egg products 
are pasteurized and yet subject to continuous inspection. Shell eggs generally are not 
pasteurized but are almost never inspected. Id. 
337 Letter from Representatives Henry A. Waxman and Bart Stupak to Austin DeCoster 
(Sept. 14, 2010) (on file with the author) (requesting additional documents in advance of 
DeCoster’s testimony). 
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of their routine inspection and grading functions, USDA officials in 
the Wright County Egg packing houses noted serious sanitation issues 
on their daily reports, but allegedly failed to share their concerns with 
FDA.338 In other words, USDA inspectors continued to grade and 
approve the shipment of eggs contaminated with SE because it was 
FDA’s responsibility to oversee the “safety” aspect of shell eggs, 
while USDA’s jurisdiction extended only to the grading of eggs for 
“quality” purposes. The information was not passed to FDA because 
“the conditions at the egg plant packing facilities were routine,”339 
and the USDA officials were “focused on grading eggs. They are not 
necessarily focused on all of the other issues that the FDA had, and all 
the responsibilities FDA had.”340 
Fortunately, new federal rules require all but the smallest shell egg 
producers—those under 3000 laying hens—to implement an SE 
prevention plan.341 In addition to monitoring pullets for SE,342 
producers must conduct environmental testing for SE at regular 
intervals.343 A positive test requires the producer to conduct tests on 
the shell eggs themselves.344 Facilities with eggs testing positive for 
SE must process the eggs to eliminate the bacteria—pasteurization as 
egg product—or divert to nonfood uses for the life of the poultry 
flock.345 FDA inspections of the DeCoster facility in August 2010—
after the CDC identification of the source of the SE contaminated 
eggs—noted that the operation has “serious deviations” from the 
FDA’s SE prevention rules.346 Part of the mandatory SE prevention 
 
338 Layton, supra note 41. See also Alicia Mundy & Bill Tomson, Egg Inspectors 
Failed to Raise Alarms, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424052748703960004575482091768513872.html. 
339 Mundy & Tomson, supra note 339. 
340 Id. (quoting USDA Secretary Vilsack). 
341 FDA SE Final Rule, supra note 65 (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 118). 
342 21 C.F.R. § 118.4 (2010). USDA’s APHIS operates the National Poultry 
Improvement Plan that certifies poultry breeding stock and hatcheries as free from 
diseases, including SE. See Helping You, The Poultry Breeder, Prevent Disease, NAT’L 
POULTRY INVOLVEMENT PLAN (U.S. Dep’t of Agric./Animal & Plant Health Inspection 
Serv.), Jan. 2006, available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal_health 
/content/printable_version/npip-helping_you.pdf. A pullet is a chicken less than twenty 
weeks old. See FDA SE Final Rule, supra note 65, at 33,030. 
343 Producers must test for SE when hens are 40–45 weeks old and 4–6 weeks after 
molting. 21 C.F.R. § 118.6 (2010). 
344 21 C.F.R. § 118.10. 
345 21 C.F.R. § 118.6(2). There are, however, some exceptions to reinstate a flock for 
shell egg sales. Id. 
346 Warning Letter from John W. Thorsky, District Director, F.D.A. to Mr. Austin J. 
Decoster, Owner, Quality Egg LLC (Oct. 15, 2010) [hereinafter FDA Warning Letter to  
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plan under the FDA regulations would have required SE testing of the 
shell eggs after the seventy-three positive tests, but the FDA’s rules 
did not take effect until July 9, 2010,347 and the agency did not inspect 
the facility until after the outbreak.348 
Perhaps an earlier roll-out and full implementation of the FDA’s 
new regulations would have prevented the outbreak and saved almost 
two thousand people the misery349 and expense of contracting this 
foodborne illness. FDA estimated that full implementation of the SE 
prevention regulations will “prevent approximately 79,170 cases of 
SE per year.”350 On the other hand, the FDA does not have the 
resources to be at every egg production facility to ensure compliance, 
and the new SE prevention rules maintain the multiagency food safety 
regime for eggs. Therefore, improved coordination and information 
sharing with USDA quality inspectors will be essential to minimize 
the chance of future SE outbreaks. 
IV 
LESSONS LEARNED? A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT THE IMPACT 
OF THE FDA FOOD SAFETY MODERNIZATION ACT 
ON LEAFY GREENS AND SHELL EGGS SAFETY 
Thus far, this Article has discussed the development over the 
previous century of the bifurcated and patchwork food safety system 
and analyzed two major foodborne illness outbreaks in the first 
decade of this millennium—leafy greens and shell eggs. The last few 
days of 2010 witnessed Congress passing what some are calling the 
most important food safety legislation since the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act in 1938. Although the actual impact of the FDA 
 
Mr. Austin J. Decoster] available at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions 
/WarningLetters/ucm229805.htm. 
347 See FDA SE Final Rule, supra note 65, at 33,034. 
348 See FDA Warning Letter to Mr. Austin J. Decoster, supra note 347. As a postscript, 
on November 30, 2010, FDA permitted Wright County Egg to resume sales of shell eggs 
to consumers from one of its six locations, based on the agency’s confirmation that the 
company had taken the necessary remedial measures to eliminate SE. See News Release, 
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Permits Wright County Egg to Begin Shipping Shell 
Eggs to Consumers (Nov. 30, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents 
/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm235179.htm. 
349 See Layton, supra note 41 (discussing the excruciating pain experienced by one SE 
victim). 
350 See FDA SE Final Rule, supra note 65, at 33,081 (summarizing costs and benefits 
of the SE prevention program). 
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Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) remains to be seen, at this 
point many of the key issues identified above remain unresolved. 
Responsibility for food safety remains divided across multiple federal 
agencies with accompanying historical approaches to food safety that 
may be suboptimal. The question of whether safety is a subset of 
quality for marketing purposes as opposed to an independent end to 
accomplish as a public good itself is an open question within the 
marketing agreement context. Finally, to the extent that agencies such 
as the USDA’s AMS persist in implementing marketing agreements 
to control safety, the voice of minority producers and consumers 
remain threatened. Despite the criticism discussed briefly below, the 
authors remain optimistic that the FSMA will meet its objectives and 
that Congress will provide the FDA the necessary funding to 
implement its wide-ranging programs. 
A.  Balkanization and Institutional Bias 
FDA’s new Salmonella testing regime may correct some of the 
jurisdictional issues regarding authority for mandating testing in the 
event of an SE positive environmental test, but the regime does not 
resolve the balkanization of responsibility and silo approach of the 
USDA graders, evidenced by their failure to communicate potential 
health hazards to the FDA or other authorities. Perhaps part of this 
rests in the fee-for-service relationship between the USDA egg 
graders and the egg production facility. Facilities agree to subject 
themselves to the grading service—it enhances marketability of their 
eggs—but must pay for the USDA inspectors. If the inspectors, who 
generally are members of the local community, raise alarm bells that 
would jeopardize the ability to sell the eggs in the more lucrative shell 
as opposed to egg product market, there would be no eggs to grade 
and thus no paycheck. A reputation of aggressive enforcement could 
motivate marginal facilities to abandon egg grading and the 
accompanying USDA quality shield. Perhaps this goes back further to 
the fundamental purpose and mission of the agency. USDA’s purpose 
is to promote agricultural production while FDA’s mission is to 
protect consumers, whether from adulterated food, unsafe drugs, or 
unreliable medical devices. In all aspects, FDA’s mission is for the 
benefit of the end user of the product—the consumer—as opposed to 
USDA’s focus on the product and producer or processor. It is these 
underlying preferences that may lead to silo reporting, jurisdictional 
squabbles, and a generalized reluctance to disappoint long-term 
agency constituents. 
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B.  For Eggs, Unlike Leafy Greens, 
Safety Is Not a Characteristic of Quality 
USDA’s shell egg grading and certification program is 
administered by the Agricultural Marketing Service, the same agency 
responsible for the proposed National Leafy Green Marketing Order 
designed to enhance the safety of leafy greens. Ironically, the agency 
notes that its grading services ensure that the shell eggs meet the 
“requirements for quality, weight, condition or other factors.”351 But 
as noted above, USDA graders—working as part of a fee-for-service 
arrangement with the egg packing facility—are not focused on safety, 
but rather grading eggs according to their quality. Safety is left to the 
FDA. But for an agency so willing to relegate safety responsibilities 
to another in the shell egg context, it is interesting that the USDA’s 
AMS is willing to stretch statutory language to regulate safety in 
another product—leafy greens—under the guise of quality. In 
common parlance, a food product should be safe to eat, whether it is 
perceived as high quality, such as grass-fed Kobe beef, or low quality, 
such as meat used for dog food. But from a regulatory perspective, the 
issue is clear: quality and safety are distinct concepts delegated to 
separate agencies. It is precisely this bifurcation of responsibilities 
that has engendered the calls for consolidation of food safety 
responsibilities and the jurisdictional authority for the agency 
responsible for food to oversee the entire food supply chain—from 
farm to fork. 
C.  The FDA Food Safety Modernization Act: 
Initial Impact Assessment 
The FDA Food Safety Modernization Act is an important piece of 
legislation that will close some of the gaps in the existing food safety 
system. Key additions and revisions to the existing food safety 
framework include: 
The ability of FDA to mandate food safety measures at the farm 
level for fruit and vegetable production—previously outside FDA’s 
 
351 Agric. Mktg. Serv., Grading, Certification and Verification, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateN&nav
ID=GradingCertificationandVerfication&leftNav=GradingCertificationandVerfication 
&page=PYShellEggGradingandCertification1&acct=poultrygrd (last modified July 19, 
2006). 
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jurisdiction as agricultural production was the exclusive purview of 
the USDA with very limited exceptions;352 
FDA authority to create a system of Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Points (HACCPs) in all food-processing facilities—a safety 
system previously limited to shellfish, juice and low-acid canned 
foods;353 
Development of regulations for the safe transportation of food;354 
Enumeration of factors upon which the agency should use to 
identify high-risk facilities and mandatory schedules for inspection 
by the FDA;355 
Authorization for FDA officials to inspect and copy all operational 
records relating to any article of food that the agency “reasonably 
believes” “will cause serious adverse health consequences . . . to 
humans or animals” from all facilities in the supply chain, with the 
exception of farms and restaurants;356 
Notwithstanding the previous limitation, during an active 
investigation of a foodborne illness outbreak, in coordination with 
state and local food safety agencies, the FDA may request farms to 
identify potential immediate recipients of any food subject to the 
investigation;357 
FDA authority to issue a regulation outlining specific record 
keeping requirements for designated “high risk” foods;358 
Protections for employees for providing information to the federal 
government or state attorney general regarding violations of the 
FFDCA;359 and, perhaps most important,360 
Provide FDA with mandatory recall authority based on a 
“reasonable probability” that a food is adulterated or misbranded 
and the exposure or use “will cause serious adverse health 
consequences” to humans or animals.361 
 
352 H.R. 2751, 111th Cong. § 105 (2011) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 419). 
353 H.R. 2751 § 103 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. §418). 
354 H.R. 2751 § 111 (directing development of regulations to implement 21 U.S.C. § 
416(b)). 
355 H.R. 2751 § 201 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 421). 
356 H.R. 2751 § 101 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 350(c)(a)(2)). 
357 H.R. 2751 § 204(f). 
358 H.R. 2751 § 204(d). 
359 H.R. 2751 § 402 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 1012). 
360 See Michael T. Roberts, Mandatory Recall Authority: A Sensible and Minimalist 
Approach to Improving Food Safety, 59 FOOD & DRUG L. REV. 563, 580–83 (2004) 
(discussing why the FDA should have mandatory recall authority). 
361 H.R. 2751 § 206 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 423). 
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Congress also included a few specific carve-outs in the FSMA to 
protect certain industries. For example, section 114 of the Act 
specifically prohibits FDA from issuing guidance or regulations for 
raw oyster post-harvest processing unless certain criteria are met, 
including extensive reporting to Congress. In October 2009, the FDA 
considered implementing postharvest processing requirements for raw 
oysters to reduce the presence of the bacteria Vibrio vulnificus.362 As 
part of a revised seafood HACCP program,363 Gulf of Mexico oysters 
harvested during warm summer months would have to undergo post-
harvest processing to reduce the potentially deadly bacteria.364 In the 
face of intense political pressure from the industry, however, the 
agency withdrew its proposal.365 The FSMA appears to further 
insulate the oyster industry from this unpopular food safety measure. 
The FSMA included two other exceptions with potentially broad 
applicability: the small farm and direct marketing exemptions. After 
intense lobbying by small farm and local food advocates,366 the 
Senate passed the Tester-Hagan Amendment to the original bill as a 
compromise to minimize the financial impact of compliance with 
many of the new statute’s provisions. Specifically, Congress 
exempted small farms that had less than $500,000 in total sales 
engaged in direct-farm marketing, so long as fifty percent of total 
farm sales were in direct sales to consumers or restaurants in the same 
state or within a 275-mile radius.367 Congress included a similar 
exemption for these entities from the HACCP requirements.368 
 
362 See Letter from Donald W. Kraemer, Deputy Director, Office for Food Safety, U.S. 
Food & Drug Administration, to the Interstate Shellfish Sanitation Conference (Oct. 16, 
2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm187015.htm. See also 
Michael Taylor, Senior Advisor the Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin., Remarks at the 
Interstate Shellfish Sanitation Conference Biennial Meeting (Oct. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm187012.htm. 
363 21 C.F.R. pts. 123, 1240 (2010). 
364 See Letter from Donald W. Kraemer, supra note 363. 
365 For a thorough discussion of the FDA’s reversal regarding oyster post-harvest 
processing, see Endres & Tarr, supra note 65, at 115–16. 
366 See Bonnie Azab Powell, Tester Amendment Protecting Local Food Production 
Now Attached to Food-Safety Fill, GRIST, Nov. 18, 2010, http://www.grist.org/article/fod  
-2010-11-18-Tester-amendment-protects-local-food. 
367 H.R. 2751, 111th Cong. § 105 (2011) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 419(f) 
(Exemption for Direct Farm Marketing)). 
368 H.R. 2751 § 103 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 418(l) (Modified Requirements for 
Qualified Facilities)). 
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With respect to leafy greens and shell eggs, a few potential impacts 
from the FSMA stand out. First, the HACCP rules in section 103 of 
the statute would apply to both leafy greens and shell egg processing 
facilities. Second, FDA’s authority under section 105 of the FSMA to 
impose farm-level food safety rules for fresh produce would apply to 
leafy green production. The ability of the FDA to impose specific 
food safety rules at the farm level appears to preempt the need for a 
nationwide leafy greens marketing agreement sanctioned by the 
AMS. Moreover, in light of FDA’s explicit jurisdiction to issue farm-
level food safety rules, any marketing agreement in conflict with the 
FDA regulations would face a preemption challenge.369 More likely, 
the industry proponents of the NLGMA would attempt to incorporate 
elements of their plan into any future FDA rule. 
Unlike with leafy greens, the FDA is unlikely to alter its current 
shell eggs safety measures in response to the FSMA. The agency, 
through the FFDCA and Public Health Service Act, already had 
substantial jurisdiction over shell egg production, and the FDA’s new 
SE prevention rule already requires a HACCP-like food safety plan. 
Moreover, Congress specifically noted in the FSMA that the new law 
does not alter or limit the USDA’s authority under the Egg Products 
Inspection Act.370 
Finally, section 204 of the FSMA directs FDA to coordinate with 
the food industry to develop pilot programs to explore methods to 
more rapidly and effectively identify foodborne illness outbreaks.371 
The pilot projects must include at least three different types of foods 
that in the last five years have been subject to significant outbreaks—
certainly shell eggs and leafy greens qualify.372 
Although it is too early to assess the full impact of the FSMA on the 
leafy greens or shell egg industry, much less offer an evaluation of the 
Act’s impact on the overall food safety system, there is much optimism 
that the FDA’s enhanced authority will break down some of the 
traditional jurisdictional barriers between food production and food 
processing, resulting in an improved food safety system. However, the 
FSMA did not significantly redistribute authority from USDA to FDA; 
 
369 But see H.R. 2751 § 403(1) (noting that the FDMA does not alter the USDA’s 
jurisdiction regarding voluntary inspection of non-amenable species under the Agricultural 
Marketing Act of 1946). 
370 H.R. 2751 § 403(4)(C). 
371 H.R. 2751 § 204. 
372 Id. 
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it merely extended FDA’s jurisdiction, leaving in place two large and 
occasionally divergent agencies responsible for food safety. Moreover, 
significant governance issues, as discussed below, persist, which 
Congress and/or the agencies should address in the near future. 
D.  Minority Representation: The Voice of Consumers 
and Small-Scale Producers in Food Safety Regulation 
Although this subtopic is worthy of a separate article, at this stage a 
brief mention is necessary as this theme occurs at several levels in the 
current food safety debate. As highlighted in the criticisms of the 
proposed NLGMA, many of the disease prevention measures impact 
production at the farm level, yet growers may not sign onto the 
proposed marketing agreement. More important, those growers 
participating in the negotiation process—such as the Proponent 
Group—represent the largest industrial-scale growers, not the small, 
independent farmer.373 Moreover, consumers of leafy greens have no 
ability to challenge the marketing agreement in the courts, thereby 
excluding the recipient of the purported safety measures from a 
substantial role in the process.374 And yet the USDA, the so-called 
“People’s Department,” 375 generally supported the NLGMA process. 
Perhaps the tide, however, is starting to turn. USDA’s “Know Your 
Farmer, Know Your Food” campaign acknowledges the role of small-
scale farming and consumer demand for fresh local food.376 And the 
Tester-Hagan Amendment to the FSMA established important 
exemptions for small scale, local food producers.377 But a real 
transformation of the current industrial-scale food supply chain into 
one that accounts for the unique characteristics of the small scale food 
producer will not occur without the sustained vocal support of the 
consuming public. 
 
373 See supra notes 269–270 and accompanying text. 
374 See supra note 294 and accompanying text. 
375 See PHILLIP MATTERA, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., INC.: HOW AGRIBUSINESS HAS 
HIJACKED REGULATORY POLICY AT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 4 (July 23, 
2004), available at http://www.nffc.net/Issues/Corporate%20Control 
/USDA%20INC.pdf (noting that President Lincoln first envisioned the USDA as the 
“People’s Agency”). 
376 See Letter to Honorable Tom Vilsack, supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also 
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Know Your Farmer, Know Your Food, USDA.GOV, http://www.usda 
.gov/wps/portal/usda/knowyourfarmer?navid=KNOWYOURFARMER (last visited Apr. 24, 
2011). 
377 See supra notes 367–68 and accompanying text. 
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V 
CONCLUSION 
Facilitating a fundamental transformation of the nation’s food 
supply system to incorporate scale-appropriate food safety measures 
that accommodate a diverse food chain should be the next focus of 
federal government action. The current regulatory framework 
described above illustrates the disconnect of the various food safety 
regulatory agencies from their constituent consumers, and the 
century-long balancing act between maximizing low-cost production 
and safe food presents a significant challenge to the agencies, but one 
that the consuming public over the last fifty years largely ignored. 
The recent widespread foodborne illness outbreaks, coupled with the 
public and media’s growing interest in local food systems, however, 
has shifted attention to the role of the agencies and the potential 
conflicting missions. While mere consumer demand and calls for 
reform may not revolutionize the current multinational food supply 
system, political pressure on agencies responsible for food safety and 
Congress in the upcoming farm bill negotiations can reshape 
organizational values and policy priorities, resulting in real change to 
the food system and, to the extent it changes the economics of diverse 
farming operations, revive the vibrancy of rural communities. 
 
